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courts interpreted the First Amendment to permit governmental
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increasingly focus on—and defer to—government’s claim to control
its workers’ expression to protect its own speech.
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More specifically, courts increasingly permit government to
control its employees’ expression at work, characterizing this speech
as the government’s own for which it has paid with a salary. This
trend frustrates a meaningful commitment to republican government
by allowing government officials to punish, and thus deter,
whistleblowing and other valuable on-the-job speech that would
otherwise facilitate the public’s ability to hold the government
politically accountable for its choices. Courts also increasingly
consider government workers to be speaking as employees even when
away from work, deferring to the government’s assertion that its
association with employees who engage in certain off-duty expression
undermines its credibility in communicating its own contrary views.
Implicit in courts’ reasoning is the premise that a public entity’s
employment relationship with an individual who engages in certain
expression communicates a substantive message to the public that the
government is entitled to control. Courts’ unfettered deference to such
claims would permit government agencies to fire workers for any
unpopular or controversial off-duty speech to which the public might
object, potentially enforcing orthodox expression as a condition of
public employment.
To be sure, government speech is as valuable as it is inevitable. But
taken together, these trends lead to the rejection of government
workers’ First Amendment claims in a growing number of cases that
undermine workers’ free speech rights as well as the public’s interest
in transparent government. Because of this shift’s normatively
troubling implications, this Article proposes a new constitutional
framework for public employee speech cases that attends more
carefully to what it is that government seeks to communicate and
whether that message is actually impaired by employee speech. It thus
proposes a less deferential approach to assessing government’s
expressive claims to its workers’ speech both on and off the job,
exploring both categorical and contextual frameworks for identifying
more precisely the comparatively small universe of workers’ speech
that actually threatens government’s own expression.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims
increasingly engage in a key, but unexamined, doctrinal shift:
although past courts focused on whether and when public employers’
interest in managerial control and operational efficiency outweighed
workers’ speech interests, courts now concentrate on—and defer to—
government’s claim to control the speech of its workers to protect its
own expression. A careful examination of this trend in light of the
values underlying the government speech doctrine, however, reveals
that courts too often permit government to assert control over
employee speech that does not actually undermine its own
expression. Courts’ increased deference in this area thus effectively
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works as a bludgeon against public employee speech when a scalpel
offers a more appropriate tool for protecting government’s legitimate
expressive interests as well as workers’ own free speech rights and the
public’s interest in transparent government. To this end, this Article
proposes a less deferential approach to assessing government’s
expressive claims to its workers’ speech both on and off the job,
exploring categorical as well as contextual frameworks for identifying
more precisely the comparatively small universe of worker speech
that actually threatens government’s own expression.
More specifically, as one component of courts’ growing
deference to government’s expressive claims, courts increasingly
permit government to control its workers’ on-the-job expression by
characterizing such speech as the government’s own for which it has
1
paid with a salary. As the Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
public employees’ speech made “pursuant to their official duties”
2
receives no First Amendment protection from employer discipline
because
the
government
should
be
permitted
to
“exercise . . . employer control over what the employer itself has
3
commissioned or created.” Lower courts routinely apply this new
bright-line rule to dispose of the First Amendment claims of a wide
range of public employees punished for their on-the-job reports of
safety hazards, ethical improprieties, and other government
4
misconduct. Examples include the rejection of First Amendment
5
challenges by prosecutors disciplined for criticizing police work,
government workers fired after reporting public officials’ financial or
6
ethical improprieties, and department heads terminated for
7
criticizing administration priorities. Courts’ unblinking deference to
such assertions thus frustrates a meaningful commitment to
republican government because it allows government officials to
punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other on-the-job speech
that would otherwise inform voters’ views and facilitate their ability
to hold the government politically accountable for its choices.
A few examples illustrate this trend. The Seventh Circuit, for
instance, applied Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
See cases cited infra note 16.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410.
See cases cited infra note 16.
See Chambers v. Dep’t of the Interior, 515 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

NORTON IN FINAL FINAL

2009]

9/3/2009 9:05:16 PM

CONSTRAINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH

5

not protect a police officer’s reports that his supervisor was engaged
in unlawful activity because the officer’s statement was made
8
pursuant to his duty to report possible wrongdoing. As concurring
Judge Rovner explained: “Detective Kolatski was performing his job
admirably at the time of these events, and although his demotion for
truthfully reporting allegations of misconduct may be morally
9
repugnant, after Garcetti it does not offend the First Amendment.”
A wide range of public employees have met similar fates after
reporting health and safety violations and financial irregularities to
the displeasure of their supervisors. The Third Circuit, for example,
applied Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not
protect internal reports of health and safety hazards—including
elevated heavy metals levels—by state troopers and firearms
instructors at the state’s shooting range because the reports were
made pursuant to their official duty to report operational problems
10
and to maintain a safe worksite. The Second Circuit similarly
concluded that the First Amendment does not protect a special
education counselor who complained about the lack of proper classes
for special education students because her official duties required her
11
to monitor her students’ needs and progress. Along the same lines,
the Seventh Circuit applied Garcetti to hold that a prison guard’s
internal reports of a possible breach of prison security were
unprotected because they took place pursuant to her official
12
responsibilities to keep the prison secure. And the Eleventh Circuit
held that the First Amendment did not protect a university employee
fired after reporting improprieties in the university’s federal financial
aid awards because her duties as a financial aid manager required her
13
to flag such problems.
In a related trend involving the First Amendment claims of
public employees disciplined for off-duty speech, government
increasingly considers its workers to be speaking as employees even
when away from work, asserting that its association with employees
who engage in certain off-duty expression undermines its credibility
in communicating its own contrary views. Examples include
8.
9.
10.
11.
order).
12.
13.

Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 597 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 599 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2007).
Woodlock v. Orange Ulster B.O.C.E.S., 281 Fed. App’x 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary
Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2007).
Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761–62 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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firefighters fired for participating in a holiday parade that featured
14
mocking racist stereotypes, a university vice president disciplined for
15
writing a newspaper column questioning gay rights, and police
officers discharged for appearing in or maintaining sexually explicit
16
websites. In response, courts often characterize such off-duty speech
as harmful not because of what it reflects about the worker’s own
ability to perform her job, but rather because of what it
communicates about the government agency as a whole. These
decisions reflect courts’ intuition that the public will inevitably
associate public employees’ off-duty expression with their
governmental employers—just as voters often ascribe the views of a
17
political candidate’s associates to the candidate himself.
Courts’ unconstrained deference to such contentions, however,
would permit government agencies to fire workers for any off-duty
speech to which the public might object without any meaningful
tether to the effectiveness of government operations. Indeed, absent
any limiting principles, certain individuals may be unemployable for
many government jobs purely because of their unpopular or
controversial off-duty expression—for example, marching in a gay
pride parade or blogging for or against either abortion or immigration
reform. This trend threatens to gain momentum with employers’
increasing ability to learn of workers’ off-duty speech through
YouTube, Facebook, and other social networking and
18
communications technologies. The effects of this trend may also
widen because of the Court’s willingness to extend its First
Amendment doctrine governing public employees’ speech to the

14. See Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006).
15. See Scott Jaschik, When Equity Official Takes Anti-Gay Stance, INSIDE HIGHER ED,
May 5, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/05/05/toledo.
16. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam); Dible v. City of
Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2008); Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 449
F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006).
17. See Shankar Vedantam, The Candidate, the Preacher, and the Unconscious Mind,
WASH. POST, May 5, 2008, at A2 (describing observers’ tendency to ascribe the views of Barack
Obama’s pastor to the candidate himself).
18. See United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (discussing First
Amendment implications of the military disciplining a servicemember for his Facebook page
advocating white supremacy); TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES
A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 326 (2007)
(“Indeed, workers, and job applicants in particular, would be well-advised to assume that
anything they say or post in publicly accessible areas of the internet will become known to
potential employers . . . .”).

NORTON IN FINAL FINAL

2009]

9/3/2009 9:05:16 PM

CONSTRAINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH

7

expression of private speakers who engage in contractual and other
19
relationships with governmental bodies.
Taken together, government’s expansive claims to control public
employees’ expression mark a disturbing trend that imperils not only
the free speech rights of more than twenty million government
20
workers, but also the public’s interest in transparent government.
This requires a new First Amendment framework that more carefully
attends to what it is that government seeks to communicate—and
whether that message is actually impaired by employee speech.
To this end, Part I describes courts’ growing deference to
government’s expressive claims when assessing public employees’
First Amendment challenges. Part II then focuses specifically on
public employees’ on-duty speech, exploring the theoretical and
practical foundations of the government speech doctrine. After
demonstrating the mismatch between current doctrine and
government’s actual expressive interests, it proposes to replace the
Garcetti rule with a considerably less deferential approach that
attends to the public’s interest in transparent government. Part III
then turns to public employees’ off-duty speech, examining the
theoretical and practical assumptions underlying government’s
concern that its association with an employee who engages in
objectionable speech away from work may undermine its own
communicative abilities. After describing courts’ tendency to defer to
this concern without articulating any meaningful limitations thereto,
this Part proposes two possible replacements for the deferential status
quo: a categorical and a contextual framework, both of which identify
more precisely the comparatively small universe of off-duty speech
that actually threatens government’s legitimate expression. These
approaches include attention to whether certain jobs trigger such
strong associations with the government that public employees in
those jobs can never escape their governmental role to speak purely
19. See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 299–300
(2007) (relying on public employee precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment
claims of a private school that had voluntarily joined a governmental athletic association); Bd.
of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (relying on public employee
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of an independent contractor);
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on public employee
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of student-athletes).
20. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT, HOURS
AND EARNINGS FROM THE CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS SURVEY (2008), available at
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=ce (reporting that federal, state, and local
governments currently employ 22,703,000 workers).
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as private citizens even when away from work, and whether the
context of the off-duty speech otherwise leads the public reasonably
to associate the expression with the government. The Article
concludes by applying those principles to a series of fact patterns, and
by addressing likely objections.
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: COURTS’ EXPANSIVE DEFERENCE
TO GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE CLAIMS WHEN ASSESSING PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES’ FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First
Amendment limits government’s ability to punish public employee
speech—although, as described in more detail below, the Court has
granted government more power to regulate the speech of its workers
21
than that of its citizens generally. This Part describes courts’
framework for assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims,
highlighting courts’ expanding deference to government’s assertions
that its own expression may be impaired by its employees’ speech
both on-duty and off.
A. Pre-Garcetti: The Pickering/Connick Balancing Test
The longstanding test for assessing claims that the government
has unconstitutionally punished public employees for their speech
requires courts to weigh the individual employee’s interest, as a
citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern against the
government’s interest, as an employer, in efficiently providing public
22
services. Under this framework, courts first assess whether the
21. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. Private employers remain constitutionally
free to control their workers’ speech because the First Amendment does not constrain private
actors. A patchwork of federal and state statutes provides some protection to private workers’
whistleblowing or other speech on certain topics. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)
(protecting workers’ speech opposing unlawful discrimination).
22. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968). The Court has held that a more rigorous standard should apply to sweeping statutory
restrictions on public employees’ speech than that applied by Pickering as a post hoc assessment
of individual disciplinary actions. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 468 (1995) (“[T]he Government’s burden is greater with respect to this statutory restriction
on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action. The Government must show
that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees
in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression’s
‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government.” (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at
571)). In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), the Court
applied this test to strike down a statutory ban on government employees’ receipt of honoraria
for off-the-job expression, concluding that the government’s operational interests were very
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contested expression’s subject matter touches upon a matter of public
23
concern as a matter of law. The Court has defined speech on a
matter of public concern as speech that addresses “a subject of
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of
24
value and concern to the public at the time of publication.” Note
that, for these purposes, the subject matter of the speech determines
25
its public or private nature, rather than its setting.
If the speech in question does not touch upon a subject of public
concern—for example, a public employee’s personal grievance about
her own working conditions that is primarily of value to the speaker
26
as opposed to the listening public —then courts routinely uphold the
government’s decision to discipline such private-concern speech
27
without any additional analysis. If, however, the plaintiff’s speech

weak in large part because “the vast majority of the speech at issue in this case does not involve
the subject matter of Government employment and takes place outside the workplace.” Id. at
470.
23. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143; Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414
(1979). Controversy remains over whether the “public concern” test is an appropriate threshold
inquiry in First Amendment disputes involving employees’ off-duty—rather than on-the-job—
speech unrelated to employment. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in
Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129, 145, 150–51 (2008) (questioning the relevance of the
public concern inquiry).
24. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam) (characterizing the
plaintiff’s sexually explicit website as failing to address a matter of public interest). Courts
sometimes struggle to distinguish speech on matters of public and private concern. See Stephen
Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public
Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988) (describing courts’ difficulty in parsing speech on matters of
public and private concern). Compare Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (characterizing any speech referring to race relations—including
hateful racial speech—as inherently of public concern), with Vinci v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs.,
253 Neb. 423, 433–34 (1997) (concluding that a public employee’s use of a racial epithet was not
a matter of public concern for First Amendment purposes).
25. See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413 (holding that a teacher’s private criticism to her principal
about the school’s desegregation efforts touched upon a matter of public concern even if not
aired publicly).
26. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141; see also Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 466
(“[P]rivate speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the
employee’s own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of
justification on the government employer.”).
27. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e have refrained
from intervening in government employer decisions that are based on speech that is of entirely
private concern. Doubtless some such speech is sometimes nondisruptive; doubtless it is
sometimes of value to the speakers and the listeners. But we have declined to question
government employers’ decisions on such matters.”); Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing
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concerns a matter of public interest, then the dispute proceeds to a
balancing inquiry. There the court weighs the value of the employee’s
speech against any detrimental impact on the government’s efficient
workplace operations, such as any adverse effect on the employee’s
own performance or the employer’s ability to maintain discipline and
28
harmony among co-workers.
The Supreme Court first applied this balancing framework in
29
Pickering v. Board of Education, when it considered the First
Amendment challenge of a public school teacher fired after writing a
letter to the local newspaper criticizing the school board’s handling of
30
various revenue-raising proposals. Upholding the plaintiff’s claim,
the Court concluded that his speech did not impair the government’s
interests in operational efficiency because it criticized board members
with whom he was not in regular contact and thus did not threaten
31
the school’s interest in harmonious working relationships.
32
Connick v. Myers offers another illustration of this test in
practice, in which the Court considered the First Amendment
challenge of a prosecutor disciplined after circulating a questionnaire
33
about office policies to her co-workers. The Court characterized
most of the questionnaire as a matter of private, rather than public,
concern—that is, simply an extension of the plaintiff’s personal
dispute with her supervisor over her transfer—because it “pertain[ed]
to the confidence and trust that [the plaintiff’s] coworkers possess in
various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a
34
grievance committee.” After concluding that a single questionnaire
item regarding improper coercion to engage in political activity did
implicate a subject of public interest and thus triggered the balancing
analysis, the Court held that the employer’s concerns about the
questionnaire’s overall impact on harmonious working relationships
their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.”).
28. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564–65
(1973) (concluding that the Hatch Act’s statutory ban on federal workers’ partisan political
activities is justified by the government’s operational interest in a federal workforce free from
political favoritism or the appearance of such favoritism); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 569–71 (1968).
29. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
30. Id. at 564.
31. Id. at 569.
32. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
33. Id. at 142.
34. Id. at 148.
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35

outweighed the First Amendment value of that particular query. In
so holding, the Court in Connick made clear its deference to
government employers’ managerial judgments:
When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s
judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity
for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the
disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships
36
is manifest before taking action.

By permitting government employers to discipline workers based
on the content or viewpoint of their speech—for example, speech
critical of the government—the Pickering/Connick analysis thus
allows government to restrict its employees’ speech in ways that
37
would be “plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.”
In other words, the Court permits government considerably greater
power to control the speech of its workers than the speech of the
general public because the government’s efficiency interest “is
elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as
38
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.”
B. On-Duty Speech: Garcetti’s New Bright-Line Rule
The Supreme Court considerably expanded government
employers’ already-substantial power over public employee speech in
Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which it established a new threshold inquiry
that strips a wide swath of government workers’ expression of any
First Amendment protection. Garcetti involved a First Amendment
challenge by a prosecutor disciplined for his internal memorandum
criticizing a police department affidavit as including serious
39
misrepresentations. A divided Court held that public employees’
speech made “pursuant to their official duties” receives no First
35. Id.
36. Id. at 151–52; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(“[W]e have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of
disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public concern, and even though
when the government is acting as sovereign our review of legislative predictions of harm is
considerably less deferential.”).
37. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995).
38. Waters, 511 U.S. at 675; see also Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2006)
(observing that, for First Amendment purposes, the government receives greater deference
when acting as a market participant than when acting as a government regulator).
39. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
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Amendment protection from employer discipline. Its reasoning
rested largely on its concern that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to
demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound
41
principles of federalism and the separation of powers.” In holding
that a government employer should remain free to
“exercise . . . employer control over what the employer itself has
42
commissioned or created,” the majority created a bright-line rule
that treats public employees’ speech delivered pursuant to their
official duties as the government’s own speech—that is, speech that
the government has bought with a salary and thus may control free
from First Amendment scrutiny.
Garcetti treated a public employee’s constitutionally protected
speech “as a citizen” as entirely separable from that employee’s now43
unprotected speech “pursuant to official duties.” In other words,
according to the Court, those two categories of speech are mutually
exclusive such that an employee’s official-duties speech can never be
characterized, for First Amendment purposes, as also expressing the
employee’s views as a citizen. The Garcetti majority made room for
just one exception, which leaves open the possibility of a different
standard for public educators’ speech that raises academic freedom
44
issues.
40. Id. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented, offering three different
views. Justice Stevens would require all claims involving employees’ speech on a matter of
public interest to proceed to balancing. See id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter,
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, predicts that “only comment on official dishonesty,
deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety”
should trump the government’s interests when such speech is delivered pursuant to an
employee’s official duties. Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). Dissenting Justice Breyer, in
contrast, would defer to government employers’ judgment in the great majority of cases,
permitting only employees’ duty-related speech that presents “professional and special
constitutional obligations” to proceed to balancing. Id. at 447–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 423 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 422.
43. See id. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”).
44. Id. at 425 (“There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted
for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason
do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”). Speech on university governance issues,
however, may be unprotected after Garcetti even if speech related to scholarship and teaching
receives some sort of academic freedom protection. See Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 774
(7th Cir. 2008) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a
tenured professor’s complaints about a university’s use of grant funds because they were made

NORTON IN FINAL FINAL

2009]

9/3/2009 9:05:16 PM

CONSTRAINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH

13

Since Garcetti, courts begin analyzing public employees’ First
Amendment claims by determining simply whether the contested
speech was delivered pursuant to the plaintiff’s official duties. If so,
the First Amendment challenge fails, regardless of the strength of the
public’s interest in the expression or its impact, if any, on the
efficiency of the government workplace. First Amendment claims
that survive the Garcetti screen—that is, constitutional challenges
involving government workers’ speech that was not delivered
pursuant to official duties—continue on to the longstanding
Pickering/Connick inquiry. Examples include not only workers’
speech on matters unrelated to their jobs, but also workers’ reports of
45
government wrongdoing to outside entities like the press or law
46
enforcement agencies if such external reporting is not part of their
official duties (even if it occurred while they were on duty).
Although public entities frequently hire workers specifically to
monitor and flag dangerous or illegal conditions, Garcetti now

pursuant to his official duties); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167–68 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a professor’s critical
statements regarding the hiring and promotion of other professors and the use of lecturers
because this speech was uttered pursuant to his official duty to participate in university
governance). Moreover, whether academic freedom protections extend beyond postsecondary
education to primary and secondary school teachers remains unclear. Compare Mayer v.
Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to
conclude that an elementary school teacher’s classroom speech occurred pursuant to her official
duties and was thus unprotected), with Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694–95 (4th
Cir. 2007) (declining to apply Garcetti to a high school teacher’s classroom speech because of
academic freedom concerns).
45. See Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 184–87 (6th Cir. 2008)
(proceeding to Pickering balancing after concluding that a public employee’s official duties did
not include responding to a reporter’s questions about a supervisor’s alleged sexual
harassment).
46. See, e.g., Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1331–33 (10th Cir.
2007) (finding the plaintiff superintendent’s communications to the school board about possible
violations of state and federal law to be unprotected because they were made pursuant to her
official duties, but permitting the superintendent’s claim involving her speech to the state
attorney general on the same topic to proceed to Pickering balancing because this speech was
not among her official duties); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545–46 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding a
corrections officer’s reports of misconduct to her superiors unprotected under Garcetti because
the internal reports were made pursuant to her official duties, but her communications with a
state senator and the state office of inspector general on the same topic could proceed to
balancing because they were not made pursuant to her official duties).
Indeed, although the Garcetti Court found Mr. Ceballos’s internal criticism of the
police unprotected by the First Amendment, it remanded his claim that his discipline was also
motivated by his speech to a local bar association that was not among his official duties.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 443–44 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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47

counterintuitively—indeed, perversely —empowers the government
to punish them for doing just that. Garcetti thus undermines the
government’s accountability to the public even while it purports to
protect the government’s own expressive interests—expression
initially recognized to have value only to the extent that it enhances
government accountability. Indeed, lower courts now routinely apply
Garcetti to dispose of the constitutional claims of public employees
fired after their job-required reports regarding hazards or
improprieties. These claims include police officers terminated after
48
reporting public officials’ illegal or improper behavior, a wide
variety of public employees discharged after detailing health and
49
safety violations, health care workers disciplined after conveying
47. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems perverse to fashion a
new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before
talking frankly to their superiors.”).
48. E.g., Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Garcetti to
conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s report to supervisors of a
fellow officer’s potential misconduct because the report was made pursuant to his official duty
to report wrongdoing); Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying
Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s report to his
supervisors about a fellow officer’s misconduct in hampering the execution of arrest warrants
because the report was made pursuant to his official duties); Sillers v. City of Everman, No.
4:08-CV-055-A, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39187, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2008) (applying Garcetti
to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s report to supervising
officers about unlawful acts committed by other police officers against citizens); Hoover v.
County of Broome, No. 3:07-cv-0009, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31485, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15,
2008) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a correction
officer’s report about other officers’ excessive use of force on a prison inmate); Baranowski v.
Waters, No. 05-1379, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21301, at *71 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008) (applying
Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s complaints to
his superiors about other police officers’ potential misconduct in a shooting); Maule v.
Susquehanna Reg’l Police Comm’n, No. 04-CV-05933, 2007 Dist. LEXIS 73065, at *39–41 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 27, 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a
police chief’s report of a local councilman’s improprieties to the state police for criminal
investigation); Wesolowski v. Bockelman, 506 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121–22 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a sheriff’s
department employee’s report that a corrections officer beat an inmate); Burns v. Borough of
Glassboro, No. 05-3034, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42069, at *22–24 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s
report to internal affairs that the chief sexually harassed another officer); Bland v. Winant, No.
03-6091, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31094, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2007) (applying Garcetti to
conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police representative’s report to the
prosecutor of a councilmember’s arrest).
49. E.g., Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the
plaintiff, a police safety officer, concedes that, after Garcetti, the First Amendment does not
protect his speech identifying a large number of cancers, miscarriages, birth defects, and other
health problems suffered by individuals working a precinct with underground gasoline tanks
when the reports are made pursuant to the plaintiff’s official duties); Green v. Bd. of County
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50

concerns about patient care, primary and secondary school
educators punished after describing concerns about student
51
treatment, and financial managers fired after reporting fiscal
52
improprieties.
Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794, 799–801 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First
Amendment does not protect a lab technician’s speech seeking to correct deficiencies in a
testing program because the speech was made pursuant to her official duties); McGee v. Pub.
Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918, 920–21 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the
plaintiff’s expressions of concern about environmental compliance were not protected by the
First Amendment because they were made pursuant to his official duties as a county water
supply district manager); McQuary v. Tarrant County, No. 4:06-CV-622-Y, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26494, at *31 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First
Amendment does not protect a medical liaison’s letters to the county sheriff’s department
contending that various policies and procedures were in violation of the law because the speech
was made pursuant to official duties).
50. E.g., Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Garcetti to
conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a nurse’s memo “reflect[ing] the concern
of a conscientious nurse to ensure and contribute to the smooth functioning of the ER and to
advocate for the well-being of the patients under her care” because these concerns were
expressed pursuant to her official duties); Barclay v. Michalsky, 493 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271
(D. Conn. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a
nurse’s report that workers in a correctional facility’s psychiatric ward were imposing excessive
restraints on patients when the reports were made pursuant to her official duties); Coward v.
Gilroy, No. 3:05-CV-285, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30075, at *11–14 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a family care home
operator’s speech expressing concern about the quality of patients’ health care); Logan v. Ind.
Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL 1750583, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2006)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a correctional facility
health care administrator’s reports about inmates’ critically inadequate nursing care because
such reports were made pursuant to her job duties).
51. E.g., Pagani v. Meriden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-CV-01115, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267,
at *10–12 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment
does not protect a teacher’s report that another teacher had shared nude photos with students
when such reports were made pursuant to her official duties); Houlihan v. Sussex Technical Sch.
Dist., 461 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260 (D. Del. 2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First
Amendment does not protect a school psychologist’s reports of Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act noncompliance because the reports were made pursuant to the plaintiff’s official
duties).
52. E.g., Thompson v. District of Columbia, 530 F.3d 914, 917–18 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that reports of corruption made by the D.C. Lottery’s chief of
security were made pursuant to his official duties and were thus unprotected); Vila v. Padrón,
484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that a university vice
president’s objections to a wide range of internal misconduct—such as the university’s failure to
comply with proper bidding procedures when awarding contracts and its use of university funds
to illustrate the poetry book of a trustee’s daughter—were unprotected); Williams v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First
Amendment does not protect an athletic director’s reports of financial irregularities to the
principal and athletic department office manager because the reports were prepared in the
course of performing his job duties); Richards v. City of Lowell, 472 F. Supp. 2d 51, 80 (D. Mass.
2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a city financial
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Garcetti’s holding that public employees’ speech delivered
pursuant to their official duties receives no constitutional protection
thus means the end of most First Amendment claims brought by
53
government workers disciplined for their on-duty speech. If the
plaintiff’s speech survives Garcetti’s initial screen, however, the
dispute then proceeds to the traditional Connick/Pickering inquiry,
when—as the next Subpart describes—courts increasingly conclude
that government’s own expressive interest in controlling its public
image eclipses workers’ expressive interests even when their speech
occurs away from work.
C. Beyond Garcetti: Application of the Pickering/Connick Test to
Off-Duty Speech
Whereas Garcetti treats public employees’ speech pursuant to
their official job duties as the government’s own and thus entitled to
no First Amendment protection, courts increasingly hold that
government may also control even its workers’ off-duty speech to
protect its own expressive interests. Courts permit government to
punish employees for such speech to prevent the delivery of a
message it fears would otherwise be sent by its association with the
plaintiff through continued employment. In these cases, the
government does not urge Garcetti’s application, acknowledging that
the contested speech did not occur pursuant to the plaintiff’s official
duties. Instead, as part of the traditional Pickering/Connick balancing
inquiry, these decisions appear to reflect courts’ intuition that the
public will inevitably associate government employees’ off-duty
expression with the agency that employs them in a way that may
undermine government’s ability to communicate its own views
54
effectively. Although this intuition is particularly powerful with
manager’s report of financial improprieties because such reports were made pursuant to his
official duties); Levy v. Office of the Legislative Auditor, 459 F. Supp. 2d 494, 497–99 (M.D. La.
2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a state
auditor’s Toastmaster speech criticizing office policy as speech pursuant to the plaintiff’s official
duties because his government employer required participation in the Toastmaster program to
improve public speaking skills).
53. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., Garcetti’s Palpable Effect on Public Employee Speech,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, May 29, 2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.
aspx?id=18606 (“Garcetti is the kiss of death for many First Amendment cases.”).
54. Here I focus only on courts’ conclusions that government workers’ off-duty speech
carries a public meaning that may compromise the effectiveness of the government agency as an
institution, rather than on the distinguishable defense that a particular plaintiff’s off-duty speech
undercuts her own ability to perform her job effectively. For examples of the latter, see infra
note 195 and accompanying text.
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respect to workers’ off-duty speech that expressly exposes their
governmental role, lower courts have increasingly extended this
rationale to permit the firing of government workers for off-duty
speech that makes no reference to their governmental employer.
Consider first the Supreme Court’s decision in City of San Diego
55
v. Roe. That case involved a police officer fired for maintaining a
sexually explicit website that included a video of himself stripping off
a police uniform and masturbating, advertisements for the sale of
police uniforms and other police equipment, and an e-mail address
56
and user profile identifying him as employed in law enforcement. A
unanimous Court rejected his First Amendment challenge,
characterizing his expression as unprotected because it did not
57
involve a matter of public concern. Interestingly, even though courts
generally rubberstamp the government’s actions once they have
characterized the contested speech as unrelated to a matter of public
58
concern, the Court here nonetheless went on to consider the
strength of the government employer’s expressive interests.
Characterizing the plaintiff’s off-duty speech as job-related because of
his purposeful reference to his employment, the Court identified the
speech as harmful not because of what it reflected about the officer’s
own ability to perform police work, but rather because of what it
communicated about the police department as a whole:
Far from confining his activities to speech unrelated to his
employment, Roe took deliberate steps to link his videos and other
wares to his police work, all in a way injurious to his employer. The
use of the uniform, the law enforcement reference in the Web site,
the listing of the speaker as “in the field of law enforcement,” and
the debased parody of an officer performing indecent acts while in
the course of official duties brought the mission of the employer and
59
the professionalism of its officers into serious disrepute.

Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is the premise that a public entity’s
employment relationship with an individual who engages in certain
55. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). San Diego may carry
implications for public employees’ substantive due process, as well as their free speech, rights.
See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization
of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85, 127–35 (2006).
56. San Diego, 543 U.S. at 78.
57. Id. at 81–84.
58. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
59. San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84.
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expression—here, sexually explicit speech that implicated his law
60
enforcement employment —communicates a substantive message to
the public that the government is entitled to control. Indeed, because
the plaintiff’s off-duty speech in San Diego intentionally implicated
his employment, it presented an especially strong threat to the
government’s own expressive interests.
With little analysis, however, lower courts have significantly
extended this holding to permit the firing of government workers for
a variety of off-duty speech that makes no reference to the
government for fear that the public will nonetheless ascribe this
61
speech to the plaintiff’s government employer. The Ninth Circuit,
for example, stretched San Diego’s reasoning when it rejected a First
Amendment challenge by a police officer who had been fired for
62
maintaining a sexually explicit website featuring his wife. Although
the website made no reference to law enforcement generally or to the
plaintiff’s employment specifically, the court concluded that the
public would inevitably associate the plaintiff’s off-duty expression
with the police department that employs him:
[I]t can be seriously asked whether a police officer can ever
disassociate himself from his powerful public position sufficiently to
make his speech (and other activities) entirely unrelated to that
position in the eyes of the public and his superiors. Whether overt or
temporarily hidden, Ronald Dible’s activity had the same practical
effect—it “brought the mission of the employer and the
professionalism of its officers into serious disrepute.” . . . The law
and their own safety demands that [police officers] be given a degree
of respect, and the sleazy activities of Ronald and Megan Dible
63
could not help but undermine that respect.

Courts have credited similar governmental concerns when
rejecting the First Amendment claims of police officers fired for racist
60. Id. at 79.
61. Co-workers, as well as the government agency itself, may share similar associational
concerns. For example, a police officer may feel that other officers’ offensive off-duty speech
debases her own public image, devaluing her employment.
62. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Thaeter v. Palm
Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying San Diego to
uphold the termination of police officers for their off-duty appearance on sexually explicit
websites).
63. Dible, 515 F.3d at 926, 928 (quoting San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81). Dible further notes that
concerns about a heckler’s veto “do not directly relate to the wholly separate area of employee
activities that affect the public’s view of a governmental agency in a negative fashion, and,
thereby, affect the agency’s mission.” Id. at 928–29.
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off-duty speech that referenced neither their employer specifically
nor law enforcement generally. The Second Circuit, for example,
denied an officer’s First Amendment challenge to his discharge for
mailing anonymous racist materials to various nonprofit organizations
that had sent him fundraising solicitations, finding the termination
justified to prevent the public from otherwise associating the officer’s
64
views with the police department as a whole. The panel majority
expressed concern not about the employee’s own performance
(indeed, the officer was assigned to a computer position that did not
require public interaction) but instead about public perceptions of the
rest of the department that could undermine the agency’s
effectiveness:
For a New York City police officer to disseminate leaflets that
trumpet bigoted messages expressing hostility to Jews, ridiculing
African Americans and attributing to them a criminal disposition to
rape, robbery, and murder, tends to promote the view among New
York’s citizenry that those are the opinions of New York’s police
officers. The capacity of such statements to damage the effectiveness
65
of the police department in the community is immense.

In sum, courts increasingly defer to government employers’ claims
that their expressive interests may be imperiled by their workers’ off66
duty speech.
To be sure, government’s expressive claims are at times
substantial, as is the case with police departments’ interest in credibly
communicating their commitment to evenhanded law enforcement
regardless of race. But absent limitation, courts’ unexamined
deference to government in these cases portends deeply troubling

64. Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146–48 (2d Cir. 2002).
65. Id. at 147; see also Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding
the firing of police officers and firefighters who engaged in mocking racial stereotypes in an offduty holiday parade); Weicherding v. Riegel, 981 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (C.D. Ill. 1997)
(“Permitting a sergeant affiliated with the Klan to remain [employed by a state correctional
center] could send the message that the facility condones or even supports the philosophy of the
Klan. This could further exacerbate racial tensions in the prison and in the community.”).
66. See Locurto, 447 F.3d at 179 (“[T]he disruption need not be actual; the Government
may legitimately respond to a reasonable prediction of disruption.”); see also Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e have consistently given greater
deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than
to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large. Few of the
examples we have discussed involve tangible, present interference with the agency’s
operation.”).
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If
implications for public employees’ free speech rights.
unconstrained, this trend would permit government agencies to fire
workers for any unpopular or controversial off-duty speech to which
the public (or the courts) might object, such as politically volatile
68
69
opinions, or sexually explicit speech that courts find “sleazy.”
II. GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE INTEREST IN ITS EMPLOYEES’
ON-DUTY SPEECH
As described above, courts increasingly defer to government’s
expressive claims without examining when and why government
expression appropriately merits governmental control free from First
Amendment scrutiny. To fill this gap, this Part first explores the
theoretical and practical foundations of the government speech
doctrine, which exempts government’s own expression from First
Amendment scrutiny. It then critiques the Supreme Court’s decision
in Garcetti as reflecting a distorted understanding of government
speech that overstates government’s communicative claims to its
employees’ on-duty speech while undermining the public interest in
70
transparent governmental speech.
A. The Government Speech Doctrine and Its Purposes
As Thomas Emerson was among the first to explain, government
must express itself if it is to govern effectively:
[Government speech] enables the government to inform, explain,
and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that attempts
to govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government
participation also greatly enriches the system; it provides the facts,
67. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a
First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 133 (criticizing San Diego as “allow[ing]
public employers to punish some off-duty speech that is ideologically obnoxious to them even
without any impact on or link to its particular operations”).
68. See Dible, 515 F.3d at 933–34 (Canby, J., concurring) (“A measureable segment of the
population, for example, is vigorously antagonistic to homosexual activity and expression; it
could easily be encouraged to mobilize were a police officer discovered to have engaged, off
duty and unidentified by his activity, in a Gay Pride parade, or expressive cross-dressing, or any
number of other expressive activities that might fan the embers of antagonism smoldering in a
part of the population.”).
69. See id. at 928 (majority opinion).
70. I earlier criticized Garcetti as a flawed government speech decision in an essay for the
University of North Carolina’s First Amendment Law Review symposium, Public Citizens,
Public Servants: Free Speech in the Post-Garcetti Workplace. See Helen Norton, Government
Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 75, 83–88 (2008).
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ideas, and expertise not available from other sources. In short,
government expression is a necessary and healthy part of the
71
system.

Government speech is thus ubiquitous and necessary. Moreover,
it valuably furthers citizens’ capacity to participate in democratic selfgovernance by enabling them to identify and assess their
72
government’s priorities and performance. Consider, for example, the
insights into government policymaking provided to the public during
the Vietnam War by the Pentagon Papers (a Department of Defense
study that reviewed U.S. military and diplomatic policy in
73
Indochina) and, more recently, by the Department of Justice’s legal
memoranda outlining the Bush administration’s views on the scope of
74
executive power in the war against terrorism. Government
expression thus carries great instrumental value because it offers its
listeners important information that furthers the public’s ability to
75
evaluate its government. Government speech also facilitates
71. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697–98 (1970)
(“[Government speech] takes the form of oral communications, such as speeches, statements,
press conferences, and fireside chats, as well as written communications, such as pamphlets,
books, periodicals, and other publications. It utilizes all available media, including printing
presses, radio and television, motion pictures, and still pictures, and it achieves its dramatic
effects through confrontations in hearings, investigations, and debates.”); see also Robert C.
Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) (“[I]t is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to
prohibit viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of speech.”); Steven Shiffrin,
Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 606 (1980) (“If government is to secure cooperation
in implementing its programs, if it is to be able to maintain a dialogue with its citizens about
their needs . . . government must be able to communicate.”).
72. Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 604 (“Governments, then, can justify subsidizing the speech
of public officials, not to reelect them or others, but because there is a substantial interest in
hearing what they have to say. . . . [T]he public would have the advantage of knowing the
collective judgment of the legislature and of knowing the views of its representatives, which
would in turn be useful for evaluating them.”).
73. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (rejecting
the government’s efforts to stop publication of the Pentagon Papers).
74. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Nov. 6, 2001),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/commissions.pdf.
75. Government speech is by no means the only type of expression that derives its
constitutional salience primarily, if not exclusively, from its instrumental value in facilitating
listeners’ informed decisionmaking. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1268 (2005) (“[A] large number of the widely accepted
justifications for freedom of speech are about the social and not individual value of granting to
individuals an instrumental right to freedom of speech.”). Commercial speech, for example,
receives constitutional protection because of its value to recipients. See Bates v. State Bar, 433
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significant First Amendment interests in sharing knowledge and
76
discovering truth by informing the public on a wide range of topics.
As an illustration, recall the Surgeon General’s groundbreaking 1964
77
report on the dangers of tobacco.
Because government speech is so important to a thriving
democracy, the constitutional standards for evaluating government’s
control of its own speech differ dramatically from those that apply to
the government’s regulation of private expression. On one hand,
government cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when
regulating private speech unless its action satisfies the demanding
78
requirements of strict scrutiny. On the other, government’s own
79
speech “is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny,” leaving the
government generally free to adopt and deliver whatever message it
80
chooses when it speaks on its own behalf. Political accountability,
rather than the Free Speech Clause, provides the recourse for those
unhappy with their government’s expressive choices.
U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (“[C]ommercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability,
nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. In short, such speech serves individual and
societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.” (citations omitted)); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (holding
that commercial speech is entitled to some constitutional protection because the “consumer’s
interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than
his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”).
76. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000)
(“[G]overnment speech can help foster debate, fleshing out views, and leading toward a more
educated citizenry and a better chance of reaching the right answer.”); Shiffrin, supra note 71, at
569 (“[S]peech financed or controlled by government plays an enormous role in the marketplace
of ideas.”).
77. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL
OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 25–32 (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/
NN/B/B/M/Q/_/nnbbmq.pdf (describing the adverse health effects of smoking).
78. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recounting the First
Amendment’s bar on government’s viewpoint-based discrimination against private speech);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992) (same). Governmental restraints on
speech only rarely survive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)
(upholding the government’s ban on campaign speech within 100 feet of polling places);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–38 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding caps on campaign
contributions).
79. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (characterizing the
Department of Agriculture’s campaign promoting beef products as government speech).
80. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (distinguishing the
government’s legitimate exercise of control over the views it itself expresses from the
government’s impermissible efforts to control the views expressed by private speakers).
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The value of government speech turns primarily on its
81
82
transparency, rather than on its popularity or even its truthfulness.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, both controversial
and inaccurate views are not only unavoidable in a full and free public
83
debate, but they often enhance the debate’s quality. The First
Amendment thus poses no bar to government’s own ability to express
the view, for example, that climate change is not the result of human
84
behavior or that Iraq harbors weapons of mass destruction; nor
should it bar government’s decision to engage employees specifically
to help deliver these views, and to discipline them if they undermine
its delivery. In these cases, the government’s transparent expressive
choices not only expose its priorities and inform voter decisions, but
also spur those with other views to “unearth and disseminate facts
85
that deepen the understanding of both speakers and listeners.”
Although the First Amendment does not demand that the
government’s speech be factually correct, note that other
86
87
constitutional, statutory, or moral constraints may require such
accuracy.

81. In contrast to the emphasis on transparency in the government speech context, speech
by anonymous private actors can be quite valuable indeed. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995) (striking down Ohio’s ban on the distribution of unsigned
political leaflets).
82. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 990 (“As a general matter, the First
Amendment does not require the speech of the state to be truthful and not misleading . . . .”).
83. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–73 (1964) (describing the value of
false speech in spurring contributions to the marketplace of ideas); see also Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“We have nothing to fear
from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left free to demonstrate their
errors . . . .” (quoting Thomas Jefferson)).
84. See Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2006) (finding no First
Amendment bar to government misrepresentations about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass
destruction).
85. Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1203 (2009) (“False speech, therefore, is valuable because it is an essential
part of a larger system that works to increase society’s knowledge.”).
86. Congress, for example, as part of its inherent investigative and oversight authority, has
the constitutional power to compel the truthful testimony of executive branch officials (and
others). See generally Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 435 (1977) (describing Congress’s
inherent contempt powers); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (same).
87. See, e.g., Note, Avoidance of an Election or Referendum when the Electorate Has Been
Misled, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1078–82 (1957) (describing statutes requiring truth in the
government’s statements accompanying propositions submitted to voters).
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Constitutional constraints other than the Free Speech Clause
may still limit governmental speech. For example, government
expression that endorses religion may violate the Establishment
Clause, and government speech that furthers race, national origin, or
88
gender discrimination may violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, although the government does not violate the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause when it prevents private speakers
89
from joining or altering its own speech, I join those who conclude
90
that government generally possesses no First Amendment rights of
91
its own, leaving legislatures free to enact laws limiting government

88. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (striking down, on equal protection
grounds, Louisiana’s law requiring that political candidates be racially identified on all ballots
and nominating papers, and stating that “by placing a racial label on a candidate at the most
crucial stage in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the state furnishes a
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group because of
race and for another”); Greene, supra note 76, at 37–38 (describing government speech that
may violate the Equal Protection or Establishment Clauses, but not the Free Speech Clause).
89. In Hohfeldian terms, government may be understood as possessing not a right but a
privilege to its own speech. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 38–44 (1913) (distinguishing
“rights” from “privileges”); Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld’s First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 914, 914 (2008) (“Existing First Amendment doctrine takes a rather clear position with
respect to the Hohfeldian structure: a First Amendment right is a right against the government
and only against the government.”).
90. Note that the Court has suggested that certain institutions with unique communicative
functions—such as universities or broadcasters—may have First Amendment interests
regardless of their public or private character. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (noting public and private broadcasters’ First Amendment
interests in journalistic freedom); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(observing that universities’ academic freedom is “a special concern of the First Amendment”).
91. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.”); MARK G. YUDOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA
42–43 (1983) (arguing that government does not possess First Amendment free speech rights);
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377, 1501–08 (2001) (arguing that recognizing government’s own First Amendment rights
is inconsistent with constitutional text and purpose). But see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n,
539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003) (declining to decide whether government entities have First
Amendment rights); id. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to recognize public
libraries as First Amendment rightsholders). Moreover, for arguments that state governments
may assert First Amendment rights against federal efforts to regulate their speech, see generally
David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637 (2006);
Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free Speech: The First
Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999).
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speech. Indeed, legislatures often do so—for example, by prohibiting
92
government from engaging in electioneering speech.
Government’s claim to speech arises most frequently as a
defense to First Amendment challenges by private speakers who seek
to alter or join what the government contends is its own expression.
93
Consider the following dispute as just one illustration: A public
school board passed a resolution opposing pending school voucher
legislation and authorizing public communication of its opposition—
along with a variety of materials supportive of its stance—on the
district’s website, as well as in e-mails and letters to parents and

92. See EMERSON, supra note 71, at 708–09 (“[T]he government can restrict its own
expression, or that of its agents (aside from their own private expression), without invading any
First Amendment right.”); KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC RELATIONS
AND PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AGENCY ACTIVITIES 5 (2005) (describing
various congressional appropriations laws that prohibit agencies’ use of funds for “publicity or
propaganda purposes”); YUDOF, supra note 91, at 170, 302 (describing statutory restrictions on
government’s partisan speech); Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 373, 376 n.18 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra note 91) (discussing statutory and
guarantee clause limits on official partisanship); Edward H. Ziegler, Government Speech and the
Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 586–98, 605 n.169 (1980)
(same).
93. For another example, consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). There, both the government and a private party
asserted that privately donated, permanent monuments in public parks reflected their own
expression. Id. at 1129–30. The Court ruled for the government, concluding that “[p]ermanent
monuments displayed on public property typically represent government speech.” Id. at 1132.
As yet another example, states increasingly claim the messages displayed on specialty
license plates as their own expression. Such claims have been met with mixed success in the
courts because the circuits have split in their characterizations of specialty license plates as
governmental or private speech. The Sixth Circuit, for example, concluded that Tennessee’s
issuance of a “Choose Life” license plate reflected the legislature’s own pro-life views and thus
constituted government speech within the state’s power to control; it thus rejected the ACLU’s
First Amendment challenge to the state’s refusal of its request for a “Pro-Choice” plate. ACLU
of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379–80 (6th Cir. 2006). In contrast, the Fourth, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits have characterized the same plates as predominantly private expression,
upholding First Amendment challenges to states’ refusal to issue plates with competing
messages. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2009); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v.
Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008) (upholding the
Arizona Life Coalition’s challenge to Arizona’s denial of its proposed “Choose Life” plate);
Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding Planned
Parenthood’s First Amendment challenge to South Carolina’s decision to issue a “Choose Life”
but not a “Pro-Choice” plate). The Seventh Circuit concluded that specialty license plates do
not constitute government speech, but it upheld the state’s rejection of a “Choose Life” plate as
a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a nonpublic forum to ensure the appearance of
government neutrality on abortion. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863–67 (7th Cir.
2008).
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school employees. A proponent of the legislation then requested
that he be allowed to post his pro-voucher materials on the district’s
website, and that he also be allowed to use the school’s
communication channels to distribute his pro-voucher materials to
95
the school community. When the district declined, he filed suit,
arguing that his exclusion constituted viewpoint discrimination in
96
violation of the First Amendment. The school district successfully
defended on the ground that the government speech doctrine permits
it to communicate its own viewpoint without any obligation to allow
97
others to join or distort that expression.
98
Courts often struggle with cases like these. Although the
Supreme Court has yet to announce a definitive test for identifying
99
government speech, it highlighted two factors as key to its
characterization of a promotional campaign as government speech in
100
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n: whether the government
established the overall message to be communicated and whether the
government approved “every word” of the message ultimately
101
disseminated. Lower courts continue to rely on these and other
102
factors when characterizing speech as private or governmental.
94. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 278–79 (4th Cir. 2008). In
the interest of full disclosure, I served pro bono as counsel of record to amici in support of
respondent school board in this case upon appeal. See Brief of Amici National School Boards
Ass’n et al., in Support of Affirmance, Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, (4th Cir. 2008)
(No. 07-1697).
95. Page, 531 F.3d at 277.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 285.
98. But not always. See Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (“There may be situations in
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is
providing a forum for private speech, but this case does not present such a situation.”).
99. 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 19:25.50 (2007) (“The Supreme
Court in Johanns did not offer a comprehensive analytical definition of ‘government speech.’”).
100. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
101. Id. at 562; see also id. at 553 (“The Beef Promotion and Research Act of
1985 . . . announces a federal policy of promoting the marketing and consumption of ‘beef and
beef products,’ using funds raised by an assessment on cattle sales and importation. The statute
directs the Secretary of Agriculture to implement this policy by issuing a Beef Promotion and
Research Order (Beef Order or Order), and specifies four key terms it must contain . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
102. A number of lower courts have synthesized various appellate decisions to create a fourfactor test for characterizing speech as private or governmental: “(1) the central ‘purpose’ of the
program in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of ‘editorial control’ exercised by
the government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the ‘literal
speaker’; and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ‘ultimate
responsibility’ for the content of the speech.” Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of
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I have urged elsewhere that a public entity seeking to claim the
government speech defense in disputes like these should establish
that it expressly claimed the speech as its own when it authorized the
communication and that onlookers understood the speech as the
103
government’s at the time of its delivery. By identifying two points at
which government must expose its expressive choices, this approach
maximizes opportunities for the public to engage in undeceived
credibility assessments and meaningful political accountability
measures. First, requiring that government identify itself as the source
of a message at the time of its creation forces government to
articulate, and thus think carefully about, its expressive decisions. It
also prevents after-the-fact manufacture of a government speech
defense as an opportunistic reaction to thwart those challenging
government’s regulation of what is in fact private speech. Second,
requiring the government to be functionally identifiable as the source
of the message at the time of its delivery (which may take place some
time after its authorization) further enhances the public’s ability to
evaluate the message’s credibility and to hold the government
accountable if it finds the message objectionable.
Because accountability efforts like petitioning and voting, rather
than the First Amendment, remain the appropriate check on
government speech, this approach emphasizes that government
speech is most valuable and least dangerous when members of the
public can identify the government as its source. If, on the other hand,
the expression’s government source is obscured because the
government fails to identify the speech as its own either formally or
functionally, then political accountability provides no meaningful
safeguard. In that case, traditional First Amendment analysis (along
Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Wells v. City & County
of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001). The continuing vitality of this four-factor test
remains uncertain after Johanns. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 963
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008) (noting that “[t]here is some question as to what
standard we should apply in differentiating between private and government speech” and
concluding that Johanns is distinguishable but instructive); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441
F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that the four-part test might have been overtaken by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns).
103. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 591–92 (2008). For other commentators’ thoughtful discussion of
the challenges posed by competing government and private claims to contested speech, see
generally Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech
Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s
Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002);
Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005).

NORTON IN FINAL FINAL

28

9/3/2009 9:05:16 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1

with its suspicion of viewpoint-based distinctions) should then apply
to any government constraints on the contested expression.
Under this approach, the school board’s website and e-mails
discussed above should be considered speech that the First
104
Amendment permits the government to control as its own. There
the board publicly opposed pending legislation, and then
communicated its opposition in e-mails, letters, and website postings
105
that expressly identified their governmental origins. In so doing, the
board provided the public with valuable information about the
opinions of a public education body on proposed education policy.
Members of the public in disagreement could then seek to elect new
board members.
But the Supreme Court has too often characterized speech as
governmental without requiring government to signal the origin of its
speech in a way that allows the public meaningfully to evaluate the
106
message and its source. Consider, for example, Rust v. Sullivan, in
which the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to federal
regulations that barred family planning clinics from making any
mention of abortion when providing federally funded counseling and
107
referrals.
Although at the time it couched its holding in
108
unconstitutional conditions terms, the Court later described Rust as
a government speech case: the government had made the expressive
choice to promote only some types of family planning, and was thus
free not only to express that view directly, but also to pay others—
like clinic workers—to express that view on the government’s
109
behalf.

104. The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion after applying the Johanns factors
described above. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 285 (4th Cir.
2008). The court distinguished the board’s actions—in which it made clear its stance, and linked
and cited to other materials that supported its position—from the creation of a chat room or
other forum for the ventilation of individual views. See id. at 284 (“Had a linked website
somehow transformed the School District’s website into a type of ‘chat room’ or ‘bulletin board’
in which private viewers could express opinions or post information, the issue would, of course,
be different.”).
105. Id. at 278–79.
106. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
107. Id. at 191.
108. Id. at 198–99.
109. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we
have explained Rust on this understanding.”).
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The First Amendment permits government to choose to
110
advocate a pro-life or a pro-choice view—or none at all —because
these choices provide the public with valuable information about its
government. As a practical matter, this means that the First
Amendment permits government to pay employees or other agents to
111
help it deliver its chosen message. But if the expression is to be
characterized as government speech exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny, the expression should be delivered in a way that allows the
public to understand it as their government’s viewpoint, so that the
message’s recipients can more accurately assess its credibility and
voters may hold the government accountable for that viewpoint.
The contested regulations in Rust, however, did not require that
112
the expression’s governmental origins be disclosed; the doctors,
nurses, and other clinic employees who provided the counseling were
advised to respond to abortion-related requests simply by saying that
“the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of
family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for
113
abortion.” As commentators have observed, patients might well
misunderstand health care professionals to be offering their own
independent counsel, rather than speaking as agents required to
convey the government’s view that abortion is not a method of family
114
planning to be discussed. Because health professionals may be
viewed as more credible than the government based on public
perception of their expertise and objectivity, patients may have been
misled into evaluating the counseling differently than they would
have if the speakers had made clear its governmental source.
110. Government’s decision to remain neutral on a particular topic may reflect a strategic
decision to conserve limited political capital or to reserve judgment on a controversy as the
public debate continues; in any event, that decision also provides the public with valuable
information about its government’s expressive choices.
111. See Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1998) (“[T]he state cannot literally speak, but can speak only through
the voices of others . . . .”).
112. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (explaining that employees of clinics receiving federal funding
were “expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even
upon specific request”).
113. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5)). Although the regulations did not require that the
government be identified as the message’s source, the majority observed that “[n]othing in [the
Title X regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in
fact hold.” Id. at 200.
114. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1394–96 (arguing that patients could
mistakenly attribute the government’s views to their doctors); Robert C. Post, Essay, Subsidized
Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 172–75 (1996) (same).
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Expressly signaling the message’s governmental origins, in contrast,
would have permitted listeners to evaluate its quality more
accurately, as well as to engage in political accountability measures if
115
they thought it appropriate to do so. Rust thus illustrates the danger
of treating expression that the government fails transparently to claim
as its own as government speech free from First Amendment
116
scrutiny.
B. When Should the First Amendment Be Understood to Permit the
Government to Claim—And Thus Control—the On-Duty Speech
of Its Employees as Its Own?
As described above, the Garcetti rule works as a bludgeon
against public employee speech when a scalpel offers a more
appropriate tool for parsing government’s legitimate expressive
interests in its workers’ on-duty speech. Because government speech
is most valuable and least dangerous when its governmental source is
apparent, the First Amendment should instead be understood to
permit government to claim as its own—and thus control as
government speech free from First Amendment scrutiny—only the
speech of public employees that it has specifically hired to deliver a
particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin and
thus open to the public’s meaningful credibility and accountability
117
checks. This is the case, for example, when a school board hires a
press secretary or lobbyist to promote its anti-voucher position, a
health department hires an employee to implement an antismoking
promotional effort, a government clinic hires a counselor to advocate
methods of family planning other than abortion, a school hires an
educator to implement its abstinence-only youth campaign, an
115. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting
tobacco companies’ First Amendment challenge to California’s surtax on cigarettes that paid for
a public health campaign criticizing the tobacco industry when the advertisements bore the
transparently governmental tagline “Sponsored by the California Department of Health
Services”).
116. For a more recent example of the Supreme Court’s failure to insist on functional
transparency as a requirement of government speech, see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,
544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). That case characterizes beef advertisements authorized by Congress
and developed under the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture as government speech even
though they did not indicate—and in fact obscured—their governmental origins to viewers; the
ads bore only the tagline “Funded by America’s Beef Producers.” Id. at 555.
117. This formulation is also consistent with the factors identified by the Johanns Court as
salient to a government speech inquiry because this formulation requires that the government
first “establish” the message to be communicated by the employee, as well as control its
ultimate delivery. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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agriculture department hires a marketer to extol the benefits of beef,
or a mayor commissions a muralist specifically to create patriotic art
for the Fourth of July or art promoting equality to celebrate Dr.
Martin Luther King’s birthday. Each of these examples demonstrates
the value of government speech, revealing to the public the
expressive choices of the government and enabling voters to evaluate
the message’s credibility and take accountability measures as
appropriate. As a result, government should be permitted to fire or
otherwise discipline an employee hired to deliver such a transparently
governmental message who carries out her communicative duties in a
way that garbles, distorts, contradicts, or otherwise undermines that
message.
In other words, courts should not apply traditional First
Amendment analysis when they are convinced that the government
itself is speaking—but courts should only be so convinced when the
government transparently exposes its views. This approach, of course,
describes a much smaller slice of public employee speech than does
118
Garcetti’s “pursuant to official duties” test. By treating as utterly
unprotected any public employee’s speech delivered pursuant to that
worker’s official duties, the Garcetti majority ignored the theoretical
foundations of government speech as exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny only because of its instrumental value to the public as
listeners. As dissenting Justice Souter made clear, the public’s interest
in what Mr. Ceballos had to say about law enforcement in no way
diminished because he uttered those views pursuant to his official
duties—indeed, the public interest may be enhanced because of his
119
proximity and expertise as a deputy district attorney.
In this way, Garcetti fails to recognize that expression constitutes
government speech exempt from First Amendment scrutiny only
when it enhances listeners’ ability to evaluate their government. The
Court instead distinguished speech that the government has paid its
employees or agents to deliver—and remains free to control—from
speech delivered by those individuals in their private capacities:
“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official
118. As discussed supra, Garcetti is not the first of the Court’s decisions to ignore the
theoretical foundations of government speech—Rust and Johanns treated government speech
similarly. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
119. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
Garcetti’s new “official duties” rule protects internal employee reports of a school’s racist hiring
practices when made by a teacher but not by a personnel manager, even though the distinction
matters not to the expression’s value to the public).
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duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
120
Amendment purposes . . . .” It thus indicated that the government
“owns,” for First Amendment purposes, speech for which it paid,
permitting governmental bodies to “exercise . . . employer control
121
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”
But a thoughtful application of this principle requires a deeper
analysis of what the government employer has “bought.” As Justice
Souter observed in dissent, the prosecutor’s office in Garcetti hired
Mr. Ceballos not to deliver a specific government viewpoint about the
infallibility of the police department’s factual assertions, but instead
122
to provide sound legal analysis and competent prosecution. Yet the
Court required no evidence that the government had received
anything other than the proficient legal work and judgment for which
123
it had paid.
Lower courts now routinely apply the expedited review offered
by Garcetti to dispose of government workers’ First Amendment
claims at great cost to the public’s interest in government
124
transparency —precisely the value that the government speech
doctrine seeks to protect. Indeed, public entities frequently hire
workers specifically to flag dangerous or illegal conditions, yet
Garcetti empowers the government to punish them for delivering just
125
“what the employer itself has commissioned.”
Although
government can and should be held politically accountable for its
120. Id. at 421 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 422.
122. See id. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the doctors in Rust, Ceballos was not
paid to advance one specific policy among those legitimately available, defined by a specific
message or limited by a particular message forbidden.”). As the Court has observed, the
prosecution’s interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
123. See Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1475 (2007) (“[T]he claim rejected in
Garcetti was as much about fairness, and about vindicating the employee’s reasonable
expectations about what the job required (and presumably therefore permitted him to do), as it
was about his liberties.”).
124. See Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (Birch, J., concurring) (“In
Garcetti, the Court has built upon Pickering and succeeding cases to give lower federal courts a
distinction in analysis that expedites review of First Amendment, retaliation cases involving
government employees . . . .”).
125. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. Professor Rosenthal urges that “[a]n employee called
upon to speak as part of his duties . . . is not exercising a ‘liberty’ interest” because such speech
“is supposed to be performed in a manner consistent with management’s wishes.” Lawrence
Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 33, 49 (2008).
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operational performance as well as for its expressive choices, Garcetti
treats a wide swath of public employee speech as entirely unprotected
without any showing of an adverse effect on government operations.
In fact, the government’s accountability for its performance may well
be undercut by the carte blanche Garcetti gives government to
discipline workers who truthfully report irregularities and
improprieties pursuant to their official duties. In short, rather than
identifying a theoretically principled approach for capturing the value
created by empowering government to control its own speech,
Garcetti instead formalistically imposed a bright-line rule to avoid the
often-challenging but entirely commonplace task of balancing
126
constitutional interests.
That the government cannot claim the speech of an employee as
its own in a particular situation does not mean that that worker’s First
Amendment claim will necessarily prevail. Public employee
expression that does not meet this demanding test for government
speech should continue on to the traditional Pickering/Connick
balancing of its value against its impact, if any, on government
127
efficiency. Public employee claims that involve speech on matters of
public interest should fail under this balancing inquiry when the
speech is intemperate or inaccurate, or when it distracts the employee
128
from performing her job. Indeed, speech delivered pursuant to a
public employee’s official duties carries significant potential to
undermine governmental efficiency—for example, when the boorish
126. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen constitutionally
significant interests clash, resist the demand for winner-take-all . . . .”); Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1187 (2007) (“Eschewing the prevailing balancing standard
governing [government employee free speech] claims, the Court adopted a new categorical rule
banning any constitutional safeguards.”).
As the Garcetti majority correctly emphasized, “Supervisors must ensure that their
employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote
the employer’s mission. . . . If Ceballos’ superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or
misguided, they had the authority to take proper corrective action.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23
(majority opinion). But the Garcetti Court then erred in failing to require the defendant to show
that Mr. Ceballos’s speech was flawed in any way. Instead, the majority’s bright-line rule treated
his speech pursuant to his official duties—no matter how temperate, accurate, or otherwise
sound—as entirely unprotected by the First Amendment.
127. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
128. Before Garcetti’s bright-line rule, courts generally characterized government workers’
allegations of unsafe, illegal, or improper behavior as matters of public concern, but reached
mixed results when weighing the value of that speech against its impact on the government
employer’s operations depending on its accuracy or tone. See, e.g., Allred, supra note 24, at 62–
63.
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tone or factual inaccuracy of that speech disrupts workplace
129
operations.
C. Anticipating Objections
Subpart II.B urged that the First Amendment should be
understood to permit government to claim as its own—and thus
control exempt from judicial scrutiny—only the speech of public
employees that it has specifically hired to deliver a particular
viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin and thus open
to meaningful credibility and accountability checks by the public. This
Subpart anticipates and answers some likely objections.
1. Concerns about Insufficiently Protecting Workers’ Speech. A
return to Pickering balancing in most of these cases, as I have
proposed, means that outcomes cannot be forecast with certainty.
This may dismay free speech advocates who fear that the
unpredictability of balancing may chill public employee speech. But
this uncertainty is greatly preferable, in my view, to workers’ all-toocertain losses as a result of Garcetti. Under Pickering, government
employers were free to ignore internal whistleblowing, but had to
think twice before punishing, and thus also deterring, it. After
Garcetti, supervisors can discipline such speech with impunity, thus
chilling valuable expression altogether to the public’s detriment.
Permitting claims involving contested speech that does not satisfy a
more calibrated definition of government speech to proceed to a
balancing inquiry encourages transparency while still attending to
130
government’s legitimate efficiency concerns.
Moreover, this proposal’s embrace of a slice, however narrow, of
employees’ on-duty speech that the government may claim as its own
may trouble those free speech advocates who question the
129. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 527 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
Pickering/Connick balancing test allows employers to discipline employee speech that is
inflammatory or misguided).
130. Moreover, the employee must ultimately prove, as an additional element of her First
Amendment claim, that her expression was a substantial or motivating factor in her punishment
by her governmental employer. If she establishes such causation, the government defendant
may still escape liability by establishing the affirmative defense that it would have taken the
same action against the plaintiff even absent her speech. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). For an example of this test, in which the court
concludes that the plaintiff failed to prove that his speech played a role in a school board’s
decision not to renew his contract, see Samuelson v. LaPorte Community School Corp., 526 F.3d
1046, 1054 (7th Cir. 2008).
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appropriateness of any categorical treatment of employee speech as
131
But these arguments
entirely the government’s to control.
underestimate government’s, and the public’s, substantial interest in
the effective delivery of transparently governmental speech: because
this speech is so valuable to the public, government should be
permitted to protect it. To be sure, some cases may present factual
challenges in determining whether an employee was indeed hired to
132
deliver a transparently governmental viewpoint, just as the current
Garcetti rule itself sometimes presents challenges in determining
whether an employee’s contested speech actually occurred pursuant
133
to her official duties. But unless government is willing to articulate
as its own—and thus be held politically accountable for—a view that
it hires all employees to promote a message of government
infallibility, the proposal here would valuably curtail lower courts’
post-Garcetti rejection of claims by workers disciplined after
reporting wrongdoing or other concerns about government
134
operations.
2. Institutional Competence Concerns. Even more likely are
objections from Garcetti’s defenders that this proposal overstates
courts’ institutional competence to weigh the interests posed by these
personnel disputes. These commentators support Garcetti as
promoting a view of accountability that focuses on government’s
responsibility to the public for its effective operations. Lawrence
Rosenthal’s thoughtful justification of Garcetti, for example, includes
the following:

131. Justice Stevens’s dissent, for example, indicates his support for a rule that would
require all claims involving employees’ speech on a matter of public interest to proceed to
balancing. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Dissenting Justice Souter
apparently agrees, but predicts that “only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately
unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety” should
prevail after such balancing. Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). Dissenting Justice Breyer, in
contrast, would defer to government employers’ judgment in the great majority of cases,
permitting only employees’ duty-related speech that presents “professional and special
constitutional obligations” to proceed to balancing. Id. at 447–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132. See Chambers v. Dep’t of the Interior, 515 F.3d 1362, 1365–66, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(discussing the firing of the Chief of the U.S. Park Police following a newspaper interview in
which she expressed concern about budgetary requests for staffing and understaffing’s adverse
impact on public security).
133. See Christine Elzer, The “Official Duties” Puzzle: Lower Courts’ Struggle with First
Amendment Protection for Public Employees After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. PITT. L. REV.
367, 367 (2007).
134. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
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After all, if the First Amendment were understood to require that
all speech-related disputes between public employees and their
superior be referred to binding arbitration overseen by the judiciary,
then politically accountable officials would be denied effective
control over public institutions, a result that would seriously
compromise the First Amendment’s commitment to ensure that the
functioning of public institutions be subject to effective political
accountability. Precisely because the electorate is ordinarily entitled
to judge the performance of public institutions, effective
accountability demands that responsibility for that performance not
become fragmented between politically accountable management
135
and judicial overseers.

As the Garcetti majority explained, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to
demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound
136
principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”
I share the view that government accountability should be the
focus of this endeavor, but I do not agree that the Garcetti rule
enabling unbridled managerial control over employee speech
“pursuant to official duties” furthers such accountability. It allows
elected officials to suppress whistleblowing and other on-the-job
communications that would otherwise facilitate the public’s ability to
engage in political accountability measures, thus frustrating a
137
meaningful commitment to republican government.
More
specifically, judicial deference imposes unacceptable costs to
accountability when conferred upon government employers who
control employee speech in a way that undermines, rather than
138
facilitates, transparent processes.
These include government
135. Rosenthal, supra note 125, at 38.
136. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
137. Relying upon the public to hold government employers politically responsible for firing
truthful whistleblowers and other employees engaged in valuable speech requires confidence
that the public will learn about such actions and the underlying speech that triggered them.
Except for high-profile whistleblowers, this may rarely be the case. See Randy J. Kozel,
Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1040 (2005) (observing
that likelihood of political backlash against government officials who discipline employees for
their speech is “most pronounced when the employee is fairly visible, generally meaning highranking, so that her dismissal causes a stir and creates the prospect of political backlash against
the firing party”).
138. Professor Rosenthal stresses the limited value of such speech to the public employee as
speaker, urging that “[a]n employee called upon to speak as part of his duties . . . is not
exercising a ‘liberty’ interest” because such speech “is supposed to be performed in a manner
consistent with management’s wishes.” Rosenthal, supra note 125, at 49. In contrast, I am
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employers who fire workers for their speech delivered pursuant to
their official duties despite (or because of) its great value to the
public’s informed decisionmaking, or government employers who fail
to identify the expressive interests they seek to protect in a way that
139
furthers political accountability.
3. Efficiency Concerns. Garcetti’s advocates also emphasize the
efficiencies created by deferring to government employers’ personnel
140
decisions. The more contextual inquiry proposed here demands
more of courts and of government litigants than simply applying
Garcetti’s bright-line rule to acquiesce in government’s managerial
judgments about official-duty speech. Dissenting Justice Souter,
however, doubted that the demands of a more speech-protective rule
141
were terribly substantial, and, as Justice Ginsburg observed in a
related context, arguments that contextual inquiries will open the
142
floodgates of litigation have been “rehearsed and rejected before.”
But even if Garcetti’s categorical approach reduces litigation and its
attendant costs, it does so while imposing substantial costs of its own
on workers’ free speech rights and the public’s interest in transparent
143
government. Indeed, as Alexander Meiklejohn explained, the First
Amendment “does not balance intellectual freedom against public

especially concerned with the public’s interest in that employee’s speech, especially when that
employee delivers precisely the speech required by her job duties—for example, speech by
public safety officers on matters of public safety and law enforcement.
139. See Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)
(“[A]s the state grows more layered and impacts lives more profoundly, it seems inimical to
First Amendment principles to treat too summarily those who bring, often at some personal
risk, its operations into public view. It is vital to the health of our polity that the functioning of
the ever more complex and powerful machinery of government not become democracy’s dark
lagoon.”).
140. See Andrew Bernie, Recent Development, A Principled Limitation on Judicial
Interference: Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1047, 1048
(2007) (defending Garcetti as “a prudent exercise of judicial restraint that avoids the specter of
judicial micromanagement of governmental affairs”).
141. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“First Amendment protection less
circumscribed than what I would recognize has been available in the Ninth Circuit for over 17
years, and neither there nor in other Circuits that accept claims like this one has there been a
debilitating flood of litigation.”).
142. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2613 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
143. Sheldon Nahmod also explains how government’s efficiency interests receive sufficient
protection through the long-existing doctrines of causation and qualified immunity. See Sheldon
H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 587 (2008).
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144

safety.” Meiklejohn’s statement remains true if one were to
substitute the term “litigation costs” for “public safety.” Moreover,
the Garcetti rule frustrates public safety as well as speaker autonomy
when it squelches reports of government improprieties and other
failures. For this reason, the judiciary’s role in protecting
145
constitutional interests ranks higher “on a scale of social values”
146
than does an interest in conserving judicial resources at all cost.
Furthermore, just as Garcetti’s defenders may underestimate the
147
First Amendment costs of its new rule,
so too may they
overestimate the efficiency benefits of protecting managerial
prerogatives. Toni Massaro, among others, contests the notion that
deference to managerial judgments necessarily promotes efficient
workplace operations:
[A] hierarchical model of organizational structure is a poor model
on which to base a theory of first amendment protection for public
employees. Available studies suggest that participatory democracy
within the workplace—including opportunities for employee
expression—may promote worker satisfaction, increase overall
workplace efficiency, and even increase employees’ participation in
148
political activity outside of work.

144. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
68 (1948).
145. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
146. See EMERSON, supra note 71, at 571 (“The hazards involved in a court’s making
determinations of this nature are admittedly formidable. But such a judgment is not totally
beyond the reach of judicial capacity.”); YUDOF, supra note 91, at 188–90 (describing courts’
institutional capacity for and experience in scrutinizing government activities for violations of
individual rights).
147. As philosopher Stephen Lukes explains in another context, “the most effective and
insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place.” STEVEN LUKES,
POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 27 (2d ed. 2005); see also EMERSON, supra note 71, at 563–64
(“Government employees may thus make important contributions to the discussion of public
issues, and those contributions may become the more vital as the viewpoint of the speaker
diverges from official policy.”). Unblinking judicial deference to government control of
employee speech similarly threatens to squelch dissent at great cost.
148. Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector
Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 5 (1987); see also EMERSON, supra note 71, at 564 (“[F]reedom
of expression on the part of government employees can play an important role in counteracting
those stultifying forces which customarily pervade bureaucracy. Organizational pressures
toward dullness and conformity in the public service can perhaps be partly overcome by
establishing firm principles that encourage, or at least protect, diversity in opinion and
discussion.”); Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor
Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1706 (2004) (“We argue that the law’s suppression of worker voice
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The proposal articulated here may thus boost government efficiency
by requiring government to articulate the threat posed to workplace
149
operations by an employee’s speech. Worker speech that actually
threatens government efficiency can then be addressed by Pickering’s
balancing analysis.
4. The Availability of Nonconstitutional Protections for Public
Employees’ Speech. Finally, the Garcetti Court defended its brightline rule as posing relatively little cost to the public’s transparency
interests because statutory and common law remedies may protect
150
whistleblowing and similar speech even if the Constitution does not.
In short, the majority trusts government to provide meaningful
nonconstitutional protections for workers’ valuable speech while on
duty.
151
But as Justice Souter explained in his dissent and as others
152
have confirmed, reality fails to support this confidence: such
protections are incomplete, patchwork, and of decidedly limited
153
154
utility. Indeed, in the great majority of the decisions cited above,
and efforts to coerce attachment yields a dysfunctional workforce of disloyal and disengaged
workers who offer relatively low productivity and poor morale.”).
149. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of
Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2005) (explaining “the contributions a rightsbased system can make to the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental activities”).
150. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2005).
151. Id. at 439–41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL SECURITY
WHISTLEBLOWERS 2 (2005) (“[T]he agencies created by Congress to safeguard the rights of
whistleblowers [] have not in many cases provided the anticipated protections . . . .”); Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1531, 1533 (2008) (describing limits of statutory protections for national security
whistleblowers).
153. Federal workers’ First Amendment remedies are already significantly limited. The
Supreme Court held that federal employees cannot bring claims in federal court for damages for
violations of their First Amendment rights because Congress provided federal employees with
an effective alternative remedy under the Civil Service Reform Act. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 388–90 (1983). Under the Civil Service Reform Act, federal workers seeking to bring a First
Amendment claim must file an initial appeal of the agency action against them before an
administrative law judge designated by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). That
decision may be reviewed by the MSPB itself, and the Board’s decision may be appealed to the
Federal Circuit. But Professor Paul Secunda’s review of these decisions concluded that federal
workers’ statutory remedies under the Act are largely meaningless as a practical matter, finding
that no First Amendment Pickering claim filed by a federal employee against his or her agency
has ever been successful on the merits before either the MSPB or the Federal Circuit. Paul M.
Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1103
(2008). State and local workers, in contrast, may bring First Amendment and other
constitutional claims against their employers in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but with
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lower courts’ application of Garcetti to reject the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claims meant the end of the case because no statutory or
155
other claims remained available.
Nor does the fact that claims involving external whistleblowing
may survive Garcetti and proceed to balancing (for example, an
employee’s reports of government misconduct to external media or
law enforcement agencies that are not considered official duties)
provide adequate alternative protections. A rule that requires
employees to raise their concerns to an entity other than their
156
employer is both unrealistic and perverse. First, it assumes, with
little foundation, that workers will be brave enough to risk their
livelihoods to reach out to outside entities that may or may not be
responsive to their reports. Second, forcing workers to air their
concerns to outsiders may create substantial inefficiencies of its own,
raising the public stakes in a way that may lead agencies to harden
their positions and adopt a defensive posture. This might lower the
possibility that the agency will simply respond with quick and quiet
internal corrections.
limitations (for example, the Eleventh Amendment limits the availability of damages against
state but not local governments). See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978);
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974).
154. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2008); Ruotolo v. City of
New York, 514 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2008); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir.
2007); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2007); Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d
506, 509 (7th Cir. 2007); Vila v. Padrón, 484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007); Spiegla v. Hull, 481
F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir.
2007); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2006); Battle v. Bd. of Regents,
468 F.3d 755, 761–62 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Sillers v. City of Everman, No. 4:08-CV-055A, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39187, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2008); Hoover v. County of Broome,
No. 3:07-cv-0009, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31485, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008); Baranowski v.
Waters, No. 05-1379, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21301, at *71 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008); Maule v.
Susquehanna Reg’l Police Comm’n, No. 04-CV-05933, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73065, at *40
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007); Wesolowski v. Bockelman, 506 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121–22 (N.D.N.Y.
2007); Barclay v. Michalsky, 493 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 (D. Conn. 2007); Coward v. Gilroy, No.
3:05-CV-285, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30075, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007); Linskey v. City of
Bristol, Civil No. 3:05-cv-872(CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26986, at *13 (D. Conn. Mar. 30,
2007); Richards v. City of Lowell, 472 F. Supp. 2d 51, 80 (D. Mass. 2007); Pagani v. Meriden Bd.
of Educ., No. 3:05-CV-01115, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267, at *8 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006);
Levy v. Office of the Legislative Auditor, 459 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499 (M.D. La. 2006); Logan v.
Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL 1750583, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 26,
2006).
156. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems perverse to fashion a
new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before
talking frankly to their superiors.”); Nahmod, supra note 143, at 580 (discussing inefficiencies
created by the Garcetti rule).

NORTON IN FINAL FINAL

2009]

9/3/2009 9:05:16 PM

CONSTRAINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH

41

III. GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS IN ITS EMPLOYEES’
OFF-DUTY SPEECH
Garcetti treats a public employee’s speech as the government’s
when that employee speaks pursuant to official duties, but courts also
increasingly consider government employees to be speaking “as an
employee” even when off duty. Without expressly invoking the
vocabulary of government speech, courts frequently permit
government to control its workers’ off-duty speech to protect its
ability to communicate its own views. This Part thus focuses on
situations in which the government seeks to prevent the delivery of a
message it fears would otherwise be sent by its association with an
employee who engages in certain speech. It starts by examining the
foundations underlying that fear.
A. The Expressive Content of Government’s Association with
Employees Engaged in Certain Off-Duty Speech
As described above, courts are increasingly willing to conclude
that employees’ speech away from work that does not refer to or
otherwise identify their employment may still affect their
157
employment because of these associations.
Applying the
Connick/Pickering balancing test, courts then generally defer to
government’s assertions that its interest in effective workplace
158
operations outweighs the plaintiff’s interest in her off-duty speech.
A growing body of social science supports courts’ intuition that an
organization’s association with individuals engaged in certain speech
can communicate a message that may undermine—or further—the
organization’s ability to communicate its own views effectively.

157. On a spectrum of attenuation, government’s concerns about the potentially damaging
effects of employee speech are most direct when an employee speaks at work about work. Next,
arguably, is speech at work not about work, followed by speech away from work about work.
But furthest afield, assuredly, is speech away from work not about work.
158. Debate continues over whether the value of the employee’s speech should be measured
solely in terms of its value to the public in facilitating self-governance or also in terms of its
value to the employee. The Court, however, values both private speaker and public listener
interests when assessing the constitutionality of a statute that limits a broad category of speech
by large numbers of government workers. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995) (“[T]he Government’s burden is greater with respect to this
statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action. The
Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of
present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed
by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government.” (citing
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968))).
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Indeed, social science reveals that onlookers often use the views
of an entity’s associates as a cognitive shortcut, or heuristic, for
evaluating the entity itself. For example, political science research has
long confirmed voters’ frequent use of third-party endorsements and
similar associations as heuristics to help predict a candidate’s own
159
views and behavior. Voters often judge candidates based on the
160
candidates’ friends and relatives, just as they frequently use the
views of interest groups endorsing a candidate to determine the views
161
of the actual candidate.
Lawrence Lessig has explored similar sorts of expressive
connections, describing the various techniques for changing a
162
message’s meaning based on its associations. He describes, for
example, the technique of “tying,” which involves “attempts to
transform the social meaning of one act by tying it to, or associating it
with, another social meaning that conforms to the meaning that the
163
architect wishes the managed act to have.” Common examples of
“tying” include celebrity endorsements, but, as Lessig observes: “The
link can transfer negative as well as positive value. A candidate for
Congress ties her opponent to the President, hoping that negative
164
views about the President will transfer to the opponent.”
Whereas the views of endorsers may often accurately predict the
endorsee’s own views, an emerging body of cognitive and social
psychology research reveals that observers also frequently use the
characteristics of a target’s associates as a heuristic for drawing
conclusions about the target herself in contexts in which such
165
conclusions are likely to be inaccurate. As one study demonstrated,
friends, relatives, and roommates of stigmatized persons are more
159. Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive
Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 953 (2001) (describing
observers’ tendency to ascribe the views of candidates’ associates to candidates themselves).
160. SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 71 (2d ed. 1994).
161. James N. Druckman, Does Political Information Matter?, 22 POL. COMM. 515, 515
(2005); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence
Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1158–59 (2003).
162. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1009
(1995).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Kristina R. Olson et al., Judgments of the Lucky Across Development and
Culture, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757, 766 (2008) (concluding, in part, that children
view targets as lucky or unlucky based on the behavior and experiences of the targets’ family
associates).
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likely to experience social rejection themselves simply as the result of
166
onlookers’ observation of their relationship with those persons.
Observers often form negative impressions of an individual who is
merely seen in the presence of a person perceived as stigmatized.
Another study, for example, found that observers rated job applicants
viewed while seated next to an overweight person more negatively
than those viewed while seated next to a person of average size.
Physical proximity alone was sufficient to create negative associations
because negative perceptions remained even when the observers were
instructed that the individuals seated next to each other did not know
167
each other. These findings lend weight to what many already
suspect: one’s associations with stigmatized persons may lead others
to view the associated person negatively, too.
The point here is simply that onlookers often rely upon the
qualities of an entity’s associates as a heuristic for assessing the
168
entity’s own characteristics, not that they are right or wise to do so.
Social science thus confirms government’s—and courts’—fear that
the public will associate the objectionable or otherwise controversial
off-duty speech of at least some public employees with the
government that employs them.
This intuition is far from new. Indeed, the emerging trend
regarding public employees’ First Amendment claims offers just the
most recent illustration of courts’ longstanding sense outside of the
169
employment setting that an institution’s association with individuals
engaged in certain speech can communicate a message that may
undermine that institution’s ability to deliver its own views
170
effectively. For example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
166. Steven L. Neuberg et al., When We Observe Stigmatized and “Normal” Individuals
Interacting: Stigma by Association, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 196, 206 (1994)
(concluding that straight male targets were more likely to be denigrated by observers when they
were seen talking with a gay male friend than with a straight male friend).
167. Michelle R. Hebl & Laura M. Mannix, The Weight of Obesity in Evaluating Others: A
Mere Proximity Effect, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 28, 35 (2003).
168. Although beyond the scope of this Article, this troubling reality raises the question of
whether the law should create incentives for such onlookers to be more discerning in the
conclusions they draw from such associations.
169. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the expressive content, if any, of an
organization’s employment decisions. In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), the
Court found, with very little discussion, that a defendant law firm had failed to demonstrate that
prohibiting it from sex-based discrimination when making its partnership decisions would
undermine its expressive choices. Id. at 77.
170. Government’s associational choices outside of the employment context may also
communicate substantive messages, inviting further concerns about their potential expressive
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171

and Bisexual Group of Boston, a unanimous Court concluded that
requiring the organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade to include a
group of gay and lesbian Irish Americans marching behind an
identifying banner would impermissibly force the parade organizers
172
to communicate a message of acceptance. In so holding, the Court
predicted that observers would draw certain conclusions about the
organizers’ views based on their public association with the
173
marchers.
Courts have also long acknowledged public schools’ similar
concerns about the expressive content of their associations, ruling
that the First Amendment permits public schools to regulate student
speech when the speech occurs in a context that would otherwise
indicate the school’s imprimatur or endorsement. In Hazelwood
174
School District v. Kuhlmeier, for example, the Court upheld a public
school’s refusal to publish in its newspaper articles discussing student
175
experiences with birth control, pregnancy, and divorce.
Emphasizing educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications
“and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
176
school,” the Court concluded that the school’s action was justified,
inter alia, by its interest in ensuring that “the views of the individual
content. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Trademarks of Privilege: Naming Rights and the Physical Public
Domain, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 932–33 (2007) (“Because a naming gesture imputes social
meaning to the physical public domain, acts of visible branding can infuse a public facility with
strong associative values that affect public perceptions and permeate the collective public
conscience. For example, both residents and outsiders are likely to view a community in which a
public school is named for Robert E. Lee very differently from a community in which a public
school is named for Martin Luther King, Jr.”).
171. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
172. Id. at 559.
173. Id. at 574–75 (“[T]he presence of the organized marchers would suggest [the parade
organizers’] view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified
social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units organized around
other identifying characteristics. . . . GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as having
resulted from the Council’s customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that
its message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”). Similarly, in
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006), the Court
observed that some such choices are more communicative than others, distinguishing expressive
decisions about whom to admit as a member or a leader or other insider from what it
characterized as a law school’s comparatively nonexpressive act of allowing military recruiters
to use its facilities. Id. at 1309–10 (“Unlike a parade organizer’s choice of parade contingents, a
law school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive.”).
174. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
175. Id. at 262–66.
176. Id. at 271.
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177

speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.” Rather than
178
claiming the speech at issue as their own, the schools in these cases
assert—and courts often agree—that a school’s association with the
speaker in a context “so closely connected to the school that it
179
appears that the school is somehow sponsoring the speech” sends a
180
message that the government is entitled to control.
181
Similarly, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, a divided Court
concluded that requiring the Scouts to retain a gay scoutmaster would
force them to communicate “that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
182
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” Even the dissent agreed
that an organization’s association with a member engaged in speech
advocating a particular viewpoint could communicate the
183
organization’s acceptance of those views. The majority and dissent,
however, sharply differed as to whether Mr. Dale’s status as gay,
without more, would communicate any substantive message about the
184
Scouts’ views. Deferring to the Scouts’ own assessment that its
association with Mr. Dale would impair its communicative interests,
the majority departed from its approach in earlier expressive

177. Id. at 271.
178. Schools have claimed a wide variety of contested expression as their own. See Chiras v.
Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a school’s choice of textbooks and
other curricular materials constitutes government speech); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 1003, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the contents of a school’s bulletin board
commemorating Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month reflected the district’s own expression
even while inviting individuals to join and contribute to it, and thus rejecting a First
Amendment challenge by a teacher who sought to post materials questioning homosexuality’s
morality).
179. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002).
180. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370–71 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc); see also Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 577 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) (“For
speech to be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school does not require that the
audience believe the speech originated from the school, only that an observer would reasonably
perceive that the school approved the speech.”).
181. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
182. Id. at 653.
183. Id. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It is certainly possible for an individual to become so
identified with a position as to epitomize it publicly. When that position is at odds with a group’s
advocated position, applying an antidiscrimination statute to require the group’s acceptance of
the individual in a position of group leadership could so modify or muddle or frustrate the
group’s advocacy as to violate the expressive associational right.”); id. at 694–95 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that “Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any
factsheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message”).
184. Id. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not likely that BSA would be understood to
send any message, either to Scouts or to the world, simply by admitting someone as a
member.”).
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association cases in which it had carefully scrutinized the record for
185
evidence of such impairment. Indeed, with very little explanation,
the Dale Court suggested that an organization’s own subjective
assessment provides the proper measure for determining whether its
association with a particular individual will actually damage its
expressive interests—that is, the Court deferred to the Scouts’
186
prediction of such an impairment. Contrast this test with the
approach taken by the unanimous Hurley Court, which instead
appeared to apply an objective standard, assessing whether a
reasonable observer would understand the association to undermine
187
the organization’s speech. In short, both Dale and contemporary
public employment cases demonstrate courts’ growing deference to
parties’ assertions that the views of their associates will be ascribed to
them in ways that will undermine their ability to communicate their
188
own views.

185. Compare id. at 653 (majority opinion) (“As we give deference to an association’s
assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s
view of what would impair its expression.”), with Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626–27
(1984) (emphasizing that although the Jaycees had “taken public positions on a number of
diverse issues, [and] . . . regularly engage[d] in a variety of . . . activities worthy of constitutional
protection under the First Amendment,” there was “no basis in the record for concluding that
admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in
these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views”).
186. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 601 (2001) (characterizing Dale as “totally undermin[ing]”
Roberts); Tobias Barrington Wolff & Andrew Koppelman, Expressive Association and the Ideal
of the University in the Solomon Amendment Litigation, 27 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 92, 101–03
(2008).
187. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 575
(1995); see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–87 (1980) (predicting that
reasonable observers would not attribute the views of leafleters to the owner of the mall, and
thus rejecting the mall owner’s First Amendment claim of compelled speech).
188. I discuss these cases not to suggest that governmental bodies have their own First
Amendment rights to expressive association, but instead to illuminate when and under what
circumstances courts have concluded that certain associations do send a substantive message
about an organization’s views. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text; see also Paul M.
Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and Public Employment, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1797–98 (2007) (expressing concern that Rumsfeld may be misunderstood
as suggesting that public law schools have First Amendment rights of expressive association and
that this misunderstanding would further diminish public employees’ constitutional rights).
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B. When Should the First Amendment Be Understood to Permit
Government to Control Its Workers’ Off-Duty Speech to Protect
Its Own Expression?
As described above, courts increasingly defer to government’s
assertion that its association with employees who engage in certain
off-duty expression undermines its credibility in communicating its
own contrary views. But unexamined deference to government’s fears
about onlookers’ reactions to workers’ off-duty speech threatens to
189
institutionalize the long-maligned “heckler’s veto” as a basis for
government’s employment actions. Indeed, the colloquy between the
190
Ninth Circuit majority and concurrence in Dible v. City of Chandler
highlights this tension between government’s employment interests
and First Amendment values: whereas the majority emphasized the
damaging effects of an officer’s sexually explicit off-duty speech to
191
the police department’s effectiveness, the concurrence focused on
192
the First Amendment costs of indulging such public reaction.

189. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787
n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The term ‘heckler’s veto’ first appeared in a footnote in Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966). We use this term to describe restrictions on speech that
stem from listeners’ negative reactions to a particular message.”). As the Supreme Court has
made clear in other First Amendment contexts, “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority’s
opinion may inspire fear.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969); see also Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970) (“[I]t is firmly settled that under
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas
are themselves offensive to some of their hearers . . . .” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 592 (1969))).
190. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008).
191. Id. at 928 (“[A]s soon as Ronald Dible’s indecent public activities became widely
known, officers in the department began suffering denigration from members of the
public . . . .”).
192. Id. at 933–34 (Canby, J., concurring) (“A measureable segment of the population, for
example, is vigorously antagonistic to homosexual activity and expression; it could easily be
encouraged to mobilize were a police officer discovered to have engaged, off duty and
unidentified by his activity, in a Gay Pride parade, or expressive cross-dressing, or any number
of other expressive activities that might fan the embers of antagonism smoldering in a part of
the population.”); see also Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Here not
only was the perceived threat of disruption only to external operations and relationships, it was
caused not by the speech itself but by threatened reaction to it by offended segments of the
public. Short of direct incitements to violence by the very content of public employee speech (in
which case the speech presumably would not be within general first amendment protection), we
think this sort of threatened disruption by others reacting to public employee speech simply may
not be allowed to serve as justification for public employer disciplinary action directed at that
speech.”).
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To prevent the imposition of a certain orthodoxy of expression
193
as a condition of public employment, attention to First Amendment
values requires that the circumstances under which government
should be permitted to control the off-duty speech of its workers to
protect its own expression should be rare and well-examined. The
remainder of this Part explores what this might mean in practice,
examining both categorical and contextual possibilities that illuminate
the inescapable trade-offs between bright-line categorical rules and
flexible multifactor assessments. Although there may be no
completely satisfying solution, I find both proposals to be preferable
to the status quo, which is far too deferential to government’s claimed
expressive interests. On balance, I prefer the contextual approach
because it better comports with my sense that the threat posed to
government’s expressive interests varies significantly with the context
of an employee’s off-duty speech even within certain categories of
employees closely identified with their governmental roles.
Before turning to this inquiry, however, several caveats are in
order. First, I do not contest government’s power to discipline
workers for their speech—off-duty or otherwise—that is obscene,
defamatory, or otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment when
194
uttered by members of the public generally. Nor do I quarrel with
public entities’ regulation of that limited universe of off-duty speech
that actually undercuts the plaintiff’s own ability to perform his job
effectively—for example, a probationary prison guard’s off-duty antiSemitic outburst at a bank that signals his own inability to handle
195
prisoners’ provocative insults when on the job. This Part’s analysis
193. See Bieluch v. Sullivan, 999 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir. 1993) (“To hold otherwise [in a case
involving the disciplining of a state trooper for off-duty speech on local political controversies]
would seriously undermine the first-amendment rights of public employees. Whenever a
government employee became personally involved in a controversial public issue, those on the
opposite side of the issue could get the employee transferred or discharged simply by expressing
a concern to the employee’s superior that government functions were being threatened.”).
194. Government—whether acting as employer or regulator—remains free to punish speech
that is unprotected by the First Amendment, such as obscenity or fighting words. See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (defining speech that rises to the level of
obscenity as unprotected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining
“‘fighting’ words” as unprotected). This Subpart focuses on employees’ off-duty speech that
would otherwise be entitled to full First Amendment protection if uttered by an individual not
employed by the government.
195. Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712, 720 (Md. 1992). In other
cases, courts similarly agreed that public employees’ off-duty speech adversely affected their
ability to perform their own jobs. See Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2007)
(concluding that corrections officers’ association with a motorcycle club with a long history of
criminal activity undermined their own effective job performance because it jeopardized their
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focuses instead on the appropriate scope of government’s power to
control its employees’ off-duty speech that may undermine its ability
to communicate its own views. Under what circumstances, then, does
the First Amendment permit government to protect its institutional
expression by controlling its workers’ off-duty speech? This query
invites a wide range of possible responses.
On one end of the spectrum, those most interested in preserving
government employers’ managerial judgments might treat
government workers as having waived their free speech rights,
revisiting Oliver Wendell Holmes’ conclusion that a policeman “may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
196
right to be a policeman.” The Supreme Court, however, has long
197
rejected that rule for reasons that remain sound today: requiring
public employees to relinquish their free speech rights as a condition
of employment suppresses expression at a great cost to key First
Amendment values in promoting individual autonomy, contributing
working relationship with other officers and their ability to work in prisons populated by club
members and rival club members); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 189–92 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that the plaintiff’s active membership in an organization that sought “to bring about
a change in the attitudes and laws governing sexual activity between men and boys. . . . had
undermined his ability to serve as a teacher” because of students’ and parents’ concerns about
his ability to perform his job duties); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 968–73 (8th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that a police officer’s racially offensive Halloween costume at a Fraternal Order of
Police lodge damaged his working relationships with fellow officers). For an expression of
concern that permitting even performance-based dismissals for public employees’ off-duty
speech poses unacceptable First Amendment costs, see Hawkins, 602 A.2d at 721–27 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
To illustrate further the distinction between performance-based and expression-based
justifications for government’s discipline of employee speech, consider the military’s prohibition
of misconduct, including speech, that operates “to the prejudice of good order and discipline”
(reflecting concern about speech that undermines servicemembers’ actual performance) or that
is “of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces” (reflecting concern about speech that
undermines the military’s expression of its own public image). 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006). Compare
United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 443–52 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (concluding that a soldier’s
Internet communications supporting white supremacy violated neither provision), with id. at
452–62 (Baker, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the facts supported a charge of discrediting the
armed forces).
196. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
197. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“To the extent that the Illinois
Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be
compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in
which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous
prior decisions . . . .”); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court long ago rejected Justice Holmes’ approach to the free speech rights of
public employees . . . .”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591–610 (1967) (rejecting
McAuliffe’s reasoning).
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to the marketplace of ideas, and facilitating citizen participation in
198
democratic self-governance.
On the other end of the continuum, one might instead entirely
199
deny government the ability to control workers’ off-duty speech.
This rule assuredly provides substantial protection for workers’ free
speech rights, but it fails to acknowledge that government does have
important expressive interests that may sometimes be imperiled even
by workers’ off-duty speech: consider, for example, the message sent
by a police chief who marches with the Klan while off-duty. This Part
thus continues on to consider alternatives that more fully address and
thus accommodate the significant interests of employees, government,
and the public alike, seeking to identify more precisely the universe of
off-duty speech that actually poses expressive threats to government’s
own speech.
1. A Categorical Approach. Consider the possibility that the
speech of government workers who serve as the voice or the face of
the government potentially poses such grave threats to government
expression to justify government’s control of even their off-duty
communications. Under this view, certain positions trigger such high
public expectations that those employees could never escape their
governmental role to speak purely as private citizens even when off
200
the job.

198. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation
and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1987) (“Most theoretical
writings have suggested variants of four different values as critical to speech protection:
individual development, democratic government, social stability, and truth.” (citations
omitted)); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L.
REV. 422, 423 (1980) (“Over the years, we have come to view freedom of expression as essential
to: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge and the discovery of truth; (3)
participation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the proper
balance between stability and change.”).
199. See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 137, at 1010 (proposing “full First Amendment protection to
employee speech that occurs off the job and is directed at audiences broader than the workplace
audience, while affording no First Amendment protection to employee speech that occurs on
the job or is directed solely at workplace audiences”).
200. This is something of a twist on social role theory, which posits that individuals often
shape their behavior to fit the expectations of others with respect to various roles. See, e.g.,
Richard E. Priehs, Appointed Counsel for Indigent Criminal Appellants: Does Compensation
Influence Effort?, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 59 (1999) (“Role theory posits that the behavior of the
individual may be shaped by the demands and rules of others . . . .”); June Louin Tapp & Felice
J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1974)
(arguing that social role theory “portrays the individual as a mirror of others’ expectations”).
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The off-duty speech of employees hired to represent legislators
201
or other governmental officials provides one example. As Judge
Jack B. Weinstein observed with respect to a state legislator’s
community relations director fired for her off-duty protest of police
practices that conflicted with the legislator’s professed support for the
police, the public may be unable to dissociate even the off-duty views
of such employees from the views of their government employer:
To summarize, legislative aides occupying positions in which their
public speech may reasonably be associated with, or mistaken for,
that of the legislator’s may constitutionally be dismissed for their
public speech. This rule applies even if the speech falls outside of the
aide’s public responsibilities. It is the perceived personal connection
between legislator and staffer, and the legislator’s resulting concern
for his constituent relations, that is critical. . . .
. . . . The close affiliation of aides and the legislators they serve
generates a strong public perception of association between the two.
This naturally leads the public to assume their views are identical.
As a result, what legislative aides say may reasonably be
understood by voters as an expression of the legislator’s position.
Even where a legislative assistant affirmatively states that a
particular statement is made in a personal capacity, constituents may
nonetheless perceive that the views of the aide were sanctioned by
202
the legislator.

Law enforcement officers likely fall into the category of
203
quintessentially public servants. The Second Circuit, for example,
suggested that all speech by public safety officers communicates a
substantive message about the department as a whole, upholding the
New York Police and Fire Departments’ firing of several employees
for their off-duty appearance on a parade float that featured mocking
stereotypes of African Americans:
Police officers and firefighters alike are quintessentially public
servants. As such, part of their job is to safeguard the public’s
opinion of them, particularly with regard to a community’s view of
201. Much of the on-duty speech of such employees may be considered government speech
entirely within the government’s power to control under the approach articulated in Part II,
because such employees are often hired specifically to deliver the views of the government
officials they represent.
202. Gordon v. Griffith, 88 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50, 57–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted).
203. Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2006).
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the respect that police officers and firefighters accord the members
of that community. . . .

....
. . . . [P]olice officers and firefighters who deliberately don
“blackface,” parade through the streets in mocking stereotypes of
African-Americans and, in one firefighter’s case, jokingly recreate a
recent vicious hate crime against a black man, might well damage
the relationship between the [police department] and [fire
204
department] and minority communities.

Under this view, public safety officers can never shed their roles
as employees because “part of their job is to safeguard the public’s
205
opinion of them” —a job duty that binds them at all times. Indeed,
law enforcement agencies have uniquely strong expressive interests
among government entities because of their reliance upon public trust
206
and cooperation for their effectiveness.
To this end, police
department codes of conduct and similar constraints often expressly
signal expectations that govern even officers’ off-duty actions—for
example, requiring that their conduct be unsullied or beyond
207
reproach. Similarly, many jurisdictions consider police officers and
208
other public safety officials as always on duty. Although these
204. Id. at 178–79, 182.
205. Id. at 178.
206. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas:
Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 482–83 (1995) (concluding that the more trust and
cooperation a government institution engenders, the more legitimate and thus the more
effective it becomes).
Some courts of appeal continue to cite with approval Holmes’s aphorism that a police
officer may have a constitutional right to speak, but no constitutional right to be a policeman—
even though the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected Holmes’s approach as inconsistent with
free speech values. E.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 931 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008); Pappas
v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2002). Although those courts’ continuing embrace of
Holmes’s since-discredited observation may demonstrate a disquieting misunderstanding of
contemporary First Amendment protections for government workers’ speech, this trend may
instead simply reflect courts’ intuition that law enforcement agencies have particularly strong
expressive interests in this context.
207. See, e.g., Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing a
law enforcement code of ethics requiring officers to “keep [their] private life unsullied as an
example to all and [to] behave in a manner that does not bring discredit” to the agency);
Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006) (describing
police department code of ethics in which officers pledge to “keep my private life unsullied as
an example to all”).
208. See, e.g., Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (characterizing
department policy as requiring officers to be on duty at all times); Revene v. Charles County
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regulations do not displace constitutional protections, they do
illustrate the extent of public expectations triggered by the power and
209
discretion conferred upon these officers, and this power may well be
relevant to the appropriate development of constitutional law
210
doctrine.
Primary and secondary school teachers may also fall within the
category of quintessentially public servants because they too face
strong public role expectations that they may not escape even when
211
away from work. Adeno Addis, for example, has characterized
teachers, along with parents and peers, as among those figures who
are expected to model behavior at all times—that is,
“comprehensively influential individual[s]”—as opposed to the
majority of workers, who carry merely “role-specific” expectations
212
limited to their behavior while on the job. Again reflecting these
expectations, teachers’ codes of conduct also often impose significant
213
off-duty restrictions.
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989); Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098, 1100–01 (7th Cir.
1977); Davenport v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 278 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)
(“[T]here is no distinction between ‘off duty’ or ‘on duty’ misconduct by a police officer. . . . By
the very nature of his employment a police officer is in the eyes of the public and for the good of
the department must exercise sound judgment and realize his responsibilities to the department
and the public at all times.”); Eubank v. Sayad, 669 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“In a
very real sense a police officer is never truly off-duty.”).
209. The argument for maximizing governmental control over law enforcement—as
opposed to most other government jobs—is bolstered by its paramilitary organization and its
resulting reliance on structure, hierarchy, and order. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day
and White by [K]night: Regulating the Political Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military
Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1158, 1166 (1996).
210. Courts generally characterize police officers as holding positions that “invite public
scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion
occasioned by the particular charges in controversy,” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.13
(1966), and thus are considered public officials for purposes of triggering the actual malice
standard in defamation cases. See, e.g., Rattray v. City of Nat’l City, 36 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir.
1994); Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir. 1981); Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d
282, 287 (Mass. 2000); Tomkiewicz v. Detroit News, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 36, 42–43 (Mich. Ct. App.
2001); Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn. 1977); DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261,
1263–64 (N.J. 2004); Hailey v. KTBS, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 857, 860–61 (Tex. App. 1996).
211. See, e.g., Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 198 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a
teacher’s position “by its very nature requires a degree of public trust not found in many other
positions of public employment”).
212. Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377,
1381 (1996).
213. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do when You Are Not at Work?: Limiting
the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 625, 681 n.378 (2004) (listing examples of teachers’ codes of conduct governing off-duty
behavior).
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In other words, some public employees may be so closely
identified with their government employer that their own views
cannot be dissociated from those of the government. To be sure, this
is—or should be—a relatively small number of government jobs
(although there may be room for disagreement over precisely how
214
small this universe should be). Not all government workers are the
same for these purposes, as some pose greater expressive threats than
215
others because of the nature of their occupation. A categorical
approach should thus defer only to government’s assertion of control
over the off-duty speech of those employees considered
quintessentially public servants. This framework would permit
government to exert a great deal of control over the off-duty speech
of employees in a few occupations, and very little control over the offduty speech of all others.
The advantages and disadvantages of this approach include those
of any bright-line rule. On the one hand, it is relatively predictable
and easy to apply once a person identifies the category of
quintessentially public servants, and thus communicates clear
expectations to employers and employees alike. For example, law
enforcement agencies could simply control the off-duty speech of
police officers across the board; police officers would then know to
adjust their expression accordingly. The off-duty speech of employees
who do not fall into the category of inescapably public servants, in
contrast, would remain protected. This type of approach has some
precedent, moreover, as courts in other legal contexts have
characterized certain workers as unable to escape their role as
employees, permitting greater employer control over their speech.
For example, private employers sometimes respond to an employee’s
claims of impermissible retaliation against statutorily protected
speech with arguments that they “owned” a certain employee’s

214. For example, although I expect that most courts and observers would characterize law
enforcement officers as falling into this category, there may be less consensus as to whether
elementary and secondary school teachers act as the face and voice of the government to the
same degree.
215. Building inspectors, for example, likely more easily escape their government role in the
public eyes when off duty. See, e.g., Murray v. Jamison, 333 F. Supp. 1379, 1380–82 (W.D.N.C.
1971) (finding that firing a city building inspection dispatcher for his Klan membership violated
the First Amendment). Of course, a building inspector who engages in race discrimination in the
performance of his job can be fired without running afoul of the First Amendment.
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speech because of her particular role, and thus the speech was not the
216
employee’s to be protected by statute.
On the other hand, the predictability and comparative
administrative ease offered by a bright-line approach must be
weighed against its rigidity and attendant limits, which include the
difficulty in identifying the right categories of employees to be treated
as unable to escape their roles as government employees for First
Amendment purposes. A categorical rule gives employers a great
deal of control over the employees who fall within that category—
control that may be unwise and unfair as both a constitutional and a
practical matter. Indeed, this rule leads to the disquieting result that
often underpaid police officers (and perhaps teachers) would face
greater speech restrictions than other public employees. Should
government be permitted to control all of police officers’ or teachers’
off-duty speech—whether racist, racially controversial, sexually
217
explicit (or, in the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, “sleazy”), coarse,
218
politically volatile, or otherwise? Consider a police officer who uses
216. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a manager’s speech related to legal implications of scheduling changes was not
protected under the Fair Labor Standards Act unless he steps “outside of his . . . role of
representing the company” to assert interests adverse to his employer); Douglas v.
DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 376 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding in-house
counsel’s speech reporting discrimination by a client/employer was unprotected by Title VII
because it divulged client confidences; speech “that breaches the ethical duties of the legal
profession is unprotected under Title VII”); McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a personnel director’s speech informing her employer of possible
FLSA violations was not protected against retaliation because she was not asserting FLSA
rights or taking a position adverse to her employer’s interests but “merely performing her
everyday duties as personnel director”); Rachel S. Arnow Richman, A Cause Worth Quitting
For? The Conflict Between Professional Ethics and Individual Rights in Discriminatory
Treatment of Corporate Counsel, 75 IND. L.J. 963, 983–85 (2000) (describing courts’ difficulties
in assessing whether in-house counsel can escape their role as attorneys—including their duty of
undivided loyalty to their clients—to speak for themselves as workers to assert discrimination
complaints against employers or clients).
Similarly, the handful of state statutes that provide protections for public and private
employees’ speech away from work generally include provisions that permit employers to
control the off-duty speech of employees in certain jobs that require them to represent the
employer at all times. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2008) (permitting
employer discipline of off-duty speech that is “reasonably and rationally related to the
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular group of
employees, rather than to all employees of the employer”).
217. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The law and their own
safety demands that [police officers] be given a degree of respect, and the sleazy activities of
Ronald and Megan Dible could not help but undermine that respect.”).
218. Along the same lines, Scott Moss has observed that courts have too quickly deferred to
certain government institutions as unique, thus underprotecting First Amendment rights. Scott
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foul or profane language while off-duty or a teacher who while offduty lobbies against or publicly criticizes education policy that he
sincerely believes to be detrimental to students, such as a local
district’s commitment to an abstinence-only program or the federal
government’s No Child Left Behind Act. Such off-duty speech may
further substantial First Amendment values not only in permitting the
expression of individual autonomy, but also in contributing to the
marketplace of ideas and facilitating citizens’ participation in
democratic self-governance.
Moreover, employees’ off-duty speech can, and does, occur in a
wide range of situations that vary in their capacity to threaten
government’s expressive interests. For example, the threat to
government expression posed by an employee’s off-duty racist speech
may vary depending on the employee’s occupation as police officer,
high school teacher, cabinet secretary, personnel manager, desktop
support technician, or motor vehicles clerk. Threats posed to
government expression may similarly vary with the content of the
contested off-duty speech: consider, for example the differing threats
to government expression posed by an employee’s off-duty use of
racial epithets, appearance in a sexually explicit video, artistic
expression that is racially explicit, participation in a gay pride parade,
or politically controversial speech, like advocacy for or against
abortion restrictions, same-sex marriage, or immigration reform.
Along the same lines, the extent of any threat to government
expression may depend on the comparatively private or public setting
of the off-duty speech. Consider, for example, an employee’s use of a
racial epithet in a conversation with a friend at home or in a bar, as
opposed to its use in a letter to the editor, at a sporting event, in a
neighborhood argument, or on a blog, Facebook entry, or YouTube
post. Government’s variable expressive interests thus invite
examination of a more flexible standard that relies on case-by-case
consideration of context to identify those situations in which
government’s expressive fears are especially legitimate.
2. A Contextual Approach. Rather than assuming that the offduty speech of government employees in certain jobs—but only in
those jobs—necessarily poses a substantial threat to government’s
A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1671 (2007)
(urging that “less institution-specific speech doctrine could take appropriate account of
institutional difference without exaggerating those differences”).
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own expression, a more flexible standard would instead require the
government to prove such a threat on a case-by-case basis. Under this
approach, an employee’s off-duty speech that does not explicitly
associate itself with the government employer should generally be
protected except in unusual circumstances. The remainder of this
Subpart explores how government might show that a worker’s offduty speech actually undermined its own ability to communicate its
views effectively.
a. Public Employee Off-Duty Speech That Makes Explicit
Reference to the Government Employer. A government worker’s
deliberate choice to refer to her employment in off-duty speech is
especially likely to lead the public to make such an association as
well. This was the case, for example, in City of San Diego v. Roe, in
which an officer’s sexually explicit website included a video of himself
stripping off a police uniform and masturbating, advertisements for
the sale of police uniforms and other police equipment, and an e-mail
address and user profile identifying him as employed in law
219
enforcement. In cases like these, government’s fears that the public
will associate the worker’s views with the government are especially
reasonable because the employee has made that link explicit.
Along these lines, observers are likely to attribute a law
enforcement officer’s speech while in uniform, even if off duty, to the
220
agency that employs her. Further emphasizing the power of the
uniform and related indicia of law enforcement employment in
linking the officer to the government that employs her, a number of
courts have emphasized an officer’s acts while in uniform as leading a
reasonable observer to conclude that the officer is acting under color
of state law for Section 1983 purposes, regardless of whether the
221
government actually authorized those actions. Indeed, the uniform
219. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam).
220. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 933–34 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a police officer’s remarks while in uniform and claiming to speak for the department
impaired the city’s interest in controlling who purports to speak on its behalf); Local 491, Int’l
Bhd. of Police Officers. v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278–87 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(upholding a city’s policy prohibiting officers from wearing uniforms at a county board of
commissioners meeting); City of Indianapolis v. Heath, 686 N.E.2d 940, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding the discipline of a police officer for making anti-Semitic remarks about the mayor
while in uniform as likely to impair “confidence in and trust of that agency among members of
the community”).
221. See, e.g., Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that an officer
was not acting under state law when committing a sexual assault because, inter alia, he was not
in uniform, carrying his gun, or driving a police car); Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115,
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serves in many ways as a brand or trademark. As is the case with
strong brands, the connection between a police uniform and the
police department itself is so substantial that observers will likely
attribute even the off-duty speech of an officer in uniform to the
department itself, just as they are likely to attribute the views
223
expressed in a letter on department letterhead to the department.
An employee’s off-duty but very public expression identifying his
employment relationship may similarly pose a substantial threat to
government’s own expression. Consider, for example, an officer’s offduty racist speech that directly references his law enforcement
position in a way that casts doubt on the department’s commitment to
224
equality —as was the case with an officer who wrote magazine
1118–19 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that an off-duty officer working as a private security guard
acted under color of state law by, inter alia, wearing his uniform, displaying his badge, and
carrying his gun); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an off-duty
officer was acting under color of state law as a bank security guard when he flashed police
identification while making a detention); Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 1977)
(concluding that officers acted under color of state law in provoking a fight when, inter alia, they
were carrying their guns and badges).
222. Trademarks are features that signal to the public the source of a service or product, and
trademark infringement actions seek to prevent one party from capitalizing on the additional
persuasive effects of having its product’s source misattributed to another, potentially more
credible, party. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 725
(2004); Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2021
(2005).
223. For an application of this principle to public employees’ speech on government e-mail
that may be the technological equivalent of letterhead, see Bowers v. Scurry, 276 Fed. App’x
278, 280–83 (4th Cir. 2008). That case rejected a First Amendment challenge by a university
human resources employee who had been disciplined for sending her colleagues an e-mail that
was critical of pay restructuring legislation that the university had specifically supported. The
court specifically noted the danger that readers would mistakenly attribute her views to the
university because the messages were sent via university e-mail and bore her signature stamp
indicating her university position. Id.
224. The Nebraska Supreme Court, for example, upheld the Nebraska State Patrol’s
discharge of a trooper discovered to have joined the Klan—and, more specifically, to have
participated in off-duty web discussions with others associated with the Klan in which he
identified himself as employed in law enforcement in Nebraska. State v. Henderson, 762 N.W.2d
1, 3–18 (Neb. 2009). The state court held “that Nebraska public policy precludes an individual
from being reinstated to serve as a sworn officer in a law enforcement agency if that individual’s
service would severely undermine reasonable public perception that the agency is uniformly
committed to the equal enforcement of the law and that each citizen of Nebraska can depend on
law enforcement officers to enforce the law without regard to race.” Id. at 17. The state supreme
court addressed only whether the lower court had correctly vacated as contrary to public policy
an arbitrator’s reinstatement award, declining to “revisit the arbitrator’s discussion of
constitutional issues, although his conclusions on those issues [—that the State Patrol had
violated the trooper’s constitutional rights—] are highly suspect.” Id. at 5. Central to the court’s
holding was its conclusion that the trooper’s off-duty expression undermined the state patrol’s
ability to control its own image: “One cannot simultaneously wear the badge of the Nebraska
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articles that identified himself as a police officer and “characterized
inner-city minority residents as ‘rats,’ women with cats as mentally
unstable, homeless people as ‘criminals,’ and children with problems
225
as ‘freaks.’” Government’s ability to establish an expressive threat
will also often vary depending on the expression’s public or private
setting: the more public the off-duty expression and its link to
government employment—for example, expression that is broadcast
over the Internet or in a letter to the editor as opposed to a private
conversation with a friend—the stronger the possibility that the
public will associate it with the governmental employer in a way that
undermines the agency’s ability to communicate its own views
226
effectively.
b. Public Perception of the Speaker’s Occupation or Position as
227
Inescapably Governmental. As discussed above, public employees
in certain occupations may find it difficult to escape their
governmental role even when off the job, such that onlookers readily
associate speech with the government employer even if the
employees themselves do not make the connection explicit. In
contrast, observers may be less likely to attribute the speech of lowerlevel employees (or employees whose positions do not require
policymaking or extensive public interaction) to the agency that
employs them. Whereas the categorical approach described in the
preceding Subpart explored occupational exceptionalism as the sole
determinant of government’s ability to control off-duty speech, a
contextual approach might consider the nature of the speaker’s
occupation one of many factors in assessing the threat to the
government’s expressive interests. Government’s showing would be
considerably stronger—although perhaps not dispositive—when the
plaintiff is a law enforcement officer, or when the plaintiff is in a
leadership position or a position that requires significant public trust

State Patrol and the robe of a Klansman without degrading what that badge represents when
worn by any officer.” Id. at 18.
225. Nixon v. City of Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 500 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2504 (2008); see also Eaton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948, 949–74 (D. Kan. 2007) (upholding
police officers’ discharge for sending racially offensive e-mails to an African-American op-ed
writer that identified their law enforcement employment).
226. See United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 443–52 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (concluding that a
servicemember’s private conversations supportive of white supremacy were considerably less
likely to threaten the armed forces’ expressive interests than his Facebook entry and other
Internet communications on the same topic.).
227. See supra Part III.B.1.
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and interaction such that the public may reasonably believe that she
228
represents the government’s views.
Also relevant to this inquiry are the content of the contested
speech and its conflict, if any, with the government’s transparently
claimed views. Attention to these factors recognizes that certain
combinations of the employee’s position and her expression’s content
pose greater expressive threats to government than others. The offduty speech of a “quintessentially public servant” is most likely to
pose a substantial threat to government’s own expressive interests
when it clashes with a message that government has articulated and
229
for which it can thus be held politically accountable.
Public safety agencies’ mission statements declaring their
commitment to nondiscriminatory law enforcement provide
230
particularly strong examples of transparent government messages,
as a police department seeking to communicate that “We enforce the
law without regard to race” may be considerably less believable when
it employs officers who are Klan members or who otherwise engage
231
in racist off-duty speech.
Police officers’ racist speech that
228. See Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing anonymous off-duty racist speech by an officer assigned to internal computer
operations from public communications of racism, especially by beat cops or policy leaders).
229. As Justice Stevens pointed out in another context, an organization’s concerns about
expressive association are at their strongest when the organization advocates a specific
viewpoint that it seeks to shield from distortion or interference by its association with a
dissenting individual speaker. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 687 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he organization must at least show it has adopted and advocated an
unequivocal position inconsistent with a position advocated or epitomized by the person whom
the organization seeks to exclude.”).
230. Many police department mission statements express a commitment to evenhandedness
(even as they vary in the breadth of their commitment). See, e.g., Porter County Sheriff’s Dep’t,
Mission Statement, http://www.portercountysheriff.com/mission-statement.html (last visited
June 21, 2009) (stating a commitment to treat “all citizens and fellow employees in a fair and
equitable manner without regard to race, gender, religion, national origin, physical or mental
disability or sexual orientation”); Ventnor City Police Dep’t, Mission Statement,
http://www.ventnorcitypolice.org/mission_statement.htm (last visited June 21, 2009) (stating a
commitment to “faithful service to the public without regard to race, religion, ethnicity, gender,
social status or political affiliation”); The Village of Niles, IL, Niles Police Department Mission
Statement, http://www.vniles.com/Content/templates/?a=69 (last visited June 21, 2009) (stating
commitment to “equally and fairly protect and serve all those people within its jurisdiction
without regard to race, color, religion, ethnicity, gender, age or sexual orientation”).
231. Consider, for example, a sheriff department’s employee who gives a television
interview publicly identifying his off-duty work as a Klan organizer as well as his employment in
law enforcement. See McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1985) (describing a
strong public reaction reflecting “the notion that Jacksonville blacks should resist arrest by
Sheriff’s personnel for fear of their lives” and holding “only that a law enforcement agency does
not violate the First Amendment by discharging an employee whose active participation in an
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undermines confidence in the agency’s declared commitment to
evenhanded enforcement may be especially threatening in light of
such agencies’ equal protection obligations along with historic and
continuing concerns about the role of race in the administration of
232
justice.
A court applying this principle might thus permit a police
department to punish a police officer’s off-duty participation in a
Klan parade but not in a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day celebration (or
in a peace rally, gay pride parade, or antiabortion demonstration)
because of the different types of threats this speech poses to the
government’s communication of its own views. But although certain
off-duty expression poses unique threats to law enforcement’s
institutional mission, not all unpopular or controversial messages
delivered by off-duty officers necessarily conflict with an agency’s
own transparently articulated views—for example, sexually explicit
but nonobscene speech, or certain controversial political views.
233
Consider, for example, the facts in Flanagan v. Munger, in which the
police department disciplined officers for stocking sexually explicit
films in their off-duty video store business after receiving complaints
234
from the public.
The officers’ expression conflicted with no
specifically articulated government viewpoint—it was simply alleged
235
to be “conduct unbecoming an officer.” Without some showing of
specific harm to its own communicative abilities, government’s
concerns that the public will simply think less of an agency that
employs an individual who engages in objectionable off-duty
expression does not constitute the sort of substantial threat to
government expression sufficient to justify control of employees’ offduty speech under a flexible contextual approach.
Such viewpoint-based distinctions in assessing expression’s
dangers—which are generally considered First Amendment
organization with a history of violent activity, which is antithetical to enforcement of the laws by
state officers, has became known to the public and created an understandably adverse public
reaction that seriously and dangerously threatens to cripple the ability of the law enforcement
agency to perform effectively its public duties”).
232. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 165–66 (1968); Barnes, supra note 209, at 1084–88
(documenting the prevalence of law enforcement officers who are members of the Klan).
233. Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).
234. Id. at 1567–68 (upholding an officer’s First Amendment challenge to his discipline for
stocking sexually explicit films in his video store as protected off-duty speech unrelated to
employment).
235. Id. at 1560.
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236

anathema —will cause many to hesitate. But the Court’s First
Amendment doctrine already permits government employers to
make viewpoint-specific distinctions when punishing on-duty speech
that may disrupt workplace operations—such as speech critical of a
237
government employer. Even outside the context of government
employment, Steven Heyman, among others, notes the limitations of
an insistence on content neutrality as “fatally one-sided, for it fails to
recognize that some kinds of speech . . . inflict serious injury precisely
238
because of their content.” He goes on to argue that hate speech is
239
especially damaging in this regard.
In a related context, Caroline Mala Corbin has characterized
government’s interest in dissociating itself from harmful messages—
like racist speech—as significantly stronger than its interest in
distancing itself from merely “distasteful” expression, like certain
sexually provocative speech or controversial political expression:
“Government association with a pro-gun or pro-choice platform may
be annoying for a reader with contrary views, but the government
240
placing its imprimatur on a Nazi flag or a racial slur hurts.” For
these reasons, off-duty viewpoints expressed by law enforcement
officers that conflict with fundamental governmental commitments
may be more damaging to the law enforcement mission than other
241
views. Indeed, such speech can be perceived as especially harmful

236. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recounting the First
Amendment’s bar on government’s viewpoint-based discrimination against private speech);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992).
237. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (permitting discipline of an employee’s
speech that was critical of her employer).
238. STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 3 (2008); see also Charles R.
Lawrence III, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J.
431, 476–81 (arguing that certain racist speech is unusually harmful precisely because of its
content); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1985) (arguing that a First Amendment insistence on content neutrality masks
and reinforces substantive inequality among speakers).
239. HEYMAN, supra note 238, at 4.
240. See Corbin, supra note 103, at 685–89; see also Clare Huntington, Family Law’s
Textures: Social Norms, Emotion, and the State, 59 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript
at 40, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he important question [is] whether the state,
through the apparatus of public law, should seek to reinforce norms that are not consistent (as
they so often are not) with principles of tolerance and equality. . . . Where the state gives
sanction to social norms that ostracize, stigmatize, or the like, that is more troubling than where
the state reinforces norms of parental concern, stability, and empathy.”).
241. As Joseph Tussman observed in the context of government’s educational expression,
“The danger in the careless use of notions of neutrality and non-partisanship is that the concern
for fairness may be taken as requiring the relinquishing of commitment.” JOSEPH TUSSMAN,
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when uttered by someone in a position of government power, even
when off-duty. Drawing these distinctions, however, requires
particular confidence in government’s—and courts’—ability to sort
the damaging effects of speech by content, an inquiry that can be
242
difficult and uncomfortable.
As is the case with the other considerations discussed in this
Subpart, this factor may not be dispositive in and of itself. The
absence of a transparent viewpoint that government seeks to protect
may not always defeat the government’s ability to establish an
expressive threat. Government’s decision to remain neutral or silent
on a particular topic, for example, may reflect a strategic decision to
conserve limited political capital or to reserve judgment on a
controversy as the public debate continues; in any event, that decision
also provides the public with valuable information about its
243
government’s expressive choices.
Normally, however, First
Amendment transparency norms should require government to
communicate clear expectations about the message that it seeks to
protect—both to promote the government’s accountability to the
public for its expressive choices and to prevent the chilling of speech
by employees uncertain about what they may say without fear of
discipline. For these reasons, government’s expressive concerns
should be considered most weighty when it has provided clear notice
of the expression that it seeks to safeguard. And in a multifactor
contextual analysis of this sort, the degree of particularity required of
such notice may well vary with the nature of the public employment.
For example, as government alter egos, law enforcement officers, and
other leaders might require less specific notice of their employers’
expressive expectations than lower-level or less high-profile jobs.
Not surprisingly, the strengths and weaknesses of the contextual
approach mirror those of most flexible standards. On one hand, the
contextual approach permits courts to tailor their rulings to the oftenunique facts of a given case. By adjusting for key distinctions in the
type of public employment and the nature and setting of the
GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 80 (1977) (discussing how public schools must be nonpartisan
yet not “neutral” in terms of their commitment to certain political values).
242. As Professor Corbin acknowledges, the distinction between “harmful” and
“distasteful” speech is “hotly contested.” Corbin, supra note 103, at 685–86.
243. Requiring organizations to speak clearly on certain topics may not be practical. See
Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite
Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1542 (2001) (noting, in another context, that a similar
requirement for private groups “misses the subtlety of speech, especially the way in which a
group can ‘speak’ about a subject by insisting on silence about that subject”).
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employee’s contested speech, this approach may enhance the
244
possibility of a satisfying outcome. On the other hand, its inherent
flexibility leads to concerns about unpredictability and inconsistency.
C. Applications and Objections
For an illustration of how the choice between a categorical and
contextual approach may lead to different outcomes, consider the
245
differing opinions in Pappas v. Giuliani. There the plaintiff police
officer brought a First Amendment challenge to his discharge for
mailing anonymous racist materials to various nonprofit organizations
246
that had sent him fundraising solicitations. The majority essentially
adopted what I have called a categorical approach, characterizing the
speech of a police officer as inevitably associated with the views of his
department, regardless of context:
For a New York City police officer to disseminate leaflets that
trumpet bigoted messages expressing hostility to Jews, ridiculing
African Americans and attributing to them a criminal disposition to
rape, robbery, and murder, tends to promote the view among New
York’s citizenry that those are the opinions of New York’s police
officers. The capacity of such statements to damage the effectiveness
247
of the police department in the community is immense.

In contrast, then-Judge Sotomayor’s dissent, using reasoning similar
to my proposed contextual standard, focused on the specific factual
context of the officer’s speech, noting that his job involved neither
policymaking nor public contact (he was assigned to a computer
station), that his speech made no reference to his employment in law
enforcement, and indeed that it was intended to be private and
248
anonymous.
Under those circumstances, she would find no
legitimate threat to the department’s public image or to its credibility
249
in communicating a commitment to racial evenhandedness.
As another illustration of a tough case, consider the example of a
prominent university human resources vice president who, on her
own time and without identifying her job, wrote a newspaper column
244. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1302
(2008) (discussing the comparative costs and benefits of rules versus standards).
245. Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002).
246. Id. at 144–45.
247. Id. at 146–47.
248. Id. at 154–59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
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250

that questioned gay rights. Does the First Amendment permit the
university to discipline her to protect the credibility of its announced
251
opposition to discrimination in all forms? The factors shaping the
extent of the threat posed by the employee’s speech cut both ways.
The university had engaged in transparent government speech for
which it could be held politically accountable: commitment to a policy
that bars sexual orientation discrimination. The worker’s speech
occurred off duty and did not reference her employer, although it
occurred in a very public setting where many readers knew of her
university position. Under either approach, the outcome may turn on
just how prominent a role in the university she played: the higher her
position, the more likely observers will associate her views with the
university, and the more likely they will understand her to speak for
the university even away from work.
Both the categorical approach and the flexible contextual
approach have their strengths and weaknesses. Both approaches also
remain vulnerable to the charge that they overstate courts’
institutional competence to weigh the interests posed by these sorts of
personnel disputes—and that instead courts should defer to
government employers’ managerial judgments about their own
252
operational needs. But, as explained earlier, unblinking judicial
acquiescence to governmental employers frustrates what should be a
foundational commitment to transparent government. Such deference
undermines those values when it permits government employers to
fire workers for their off-duty speech without identifying real threats
to the government’s own expressive interests for which it can be held
politically accountable.
There may be no completely satisfying solution, but I find both
the categorical approach and the flexible contextual approach to be
preferable to the status quo, which is far too deferential to
government’s claimed expressive interests. On balance, the
contextual approach better comports with the notion that the threat
posed to government’s expressive interests varies significantly with
the context of an employee’s off-duty speech even within certain
categories of employees closely identified with their governmental
roles.
250. See Jaschik, supra note 15.
251. Of course, the First Amendment poses no bar to disciplining her for her conduct, rather
than her speech, if she is found to have engaged in discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation while on the job.
252. See supra notes 54–69 and accompanying text.
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The flexibility of a multifactor contextual standard invites
charges that it is too difficult to apply and will generate unacceptably
unpredictable results. Inquiries into whether and when employers can
be said to “own” (and thus control) the off-duty speech of employees
based on public perception, however, are not uncommon in other
253
legal contexts. Moreover, for an example of the Supreme Court’s
ability to apply a similar contextual inquiry to employee speech while
254
at work, consider Rankin v. McPherson, in which the Court found
no substantial threat to the government’s expressive interests after
considering the plaintiff’s position, the nature of her speech, and its
255
setting. There, the plaintiff, a nineteen-year-old clerk in the sheriff’s
department, was assigned to a work station that did not involve public
contact in a job that required her to “type data from court papers into
256
a computer.” She “was not a commissioned peace officer, did not
wear a uniform, and was not authorized to make arrests or permitted
257
to carry a gun.” She was fired for stating, after hearing of the
assassination attempt on President Reagan, “[I]f they go for him
258
again, I hope they get him.” The remark took place at work during a
private conversation between the plaintiff and her boyfriend, who was
259
also a co-worker. Although the sheriff’s department has a legitimate
expressive interest in protecting the public’s understanding of its
260
transparent commitment to vigorous law enforcement, under these
circumstances, the plaintiff’s speech posed little threat to that
expression: the speech was uttered by a nonuniformed employee in a
private conversation heard by no member of the public. As
concurring Justice Powell observed, “The risk that a single, offhand

253. For example, private employers as principals are held to “own”—and thus be held
legally responsible for—the defamatory or otherwise intentionally tortious speech of their
employees and agents. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006). This requires courts
to determine whether “a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf
of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” Id. § 2.03.
254. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
255. Id. at 379–94.
256. Id. at 380–81.
257. Id. at 380.
258. Id. at 381. Even though it occurred at work, the plaintiff’s speech did not satisfy the test
for government speech proposed in Part II because she was not hired to deliver a specific
viewpoint on the part of the government; indeed, her speech would not even fall within
Garcetti’s much more government-friendly “pursuant to official duties” test.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 401 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the sheriff’s interest in maintaining a
“public image consistent with his office’s law enforcement duties”).
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comment directed to only one other worker will . . . undermine the
261
mission of the office borders on the fanciful.”
In dissent, Justice Scalia bemoaned the effect of the majority’s
holding on what I have characterized as government’s expressive
interests:
I, for one, do not look forward to the new First Amendment
world the Court creates, in which nonpolicymaking employees of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission must be permitted to
make remarks on the job approving of racial discrimination,
nonpolicymaking employees of the Selective Service System to
advocate noncompliance with the draft laws, and . . .
nonpolicymaking constable’s deputies to express approval for the
262
assassination of the President.

Although Justice Scalia correctly identifies government’s expressive
interests, the examples he cites may or may not threaten those
interests depending on the context. On one hand, they clash with
transparently claimed government viewpoints. On the other hand,
they pose considerably less risk to government’s expressive interests
if uttered off-duty by a low-level employee, especially when the
employee is out of uniform or engaged in a private conversation
rather than speaking in a public setting.
To be sure, a contextual approach still makes for hard cases. But
one of my hopes is that courts will understand these as hard cases,
rather than creating too-simplistic rules that obviate the need to
engage in the challenging task of contextual inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Government workers speak in a wide variety of settings.
Sometimes they speak for the government, sometimes they speak for
themselves, and sometimes they speak for themselves in ways that
reflect on their government employer. Justice Stevens recognized this
complexity when he observed that the correct answer to the question
whether the First Amendment protects public employee speech “is
263
‘Sometimes,’ not ‘Never.’”
In recent years, however, courts have increasingly answered
“Hardly ever” to the question of whether the First Amendment
261. Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 400–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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protects public employees’ speech. Courts’ expansive, but largely
unexamined, deference to government’s own expressive claims offers
a helpful prism through which to understand this trend. For example,
after Garcetti too quickly characterized employees’ on-duty speech as
the government’s own and thus entirely within the government’s
power to control, lower courts now routinely apply Garcetti’s brightline rule to reject the First Amendment claims of public employees
punished after their on-the-job reports of safety hazards, financial
improprieties, and a wide range of other legal and ethical misconduct.
In other cases, courts too readily permit government to punish public
employees for their speech away from work, deferring to government
claims that even off-duty expression sufficiently reflects on the
government to justify the government’s control of that speech as well.
Taken together, these trends now lead to the rejection of public
employees’ free speech claims in a growing range of cases,
threatening key First Amendment values. More careful attention to
what it is that government seeks to express—and whether that
expression is actually threatened by contested employee speech—can
help capture and accommodate those interests more precisely while
providing greater protection for workers’ own free speech rights as
well as the public’s interest in transparent government.

